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Abstract 
 
This paper examines if the market rationally prices the loan loss provisions, and the fair value 
gains and losses of US banks. We also model the discretionary components of loan loss 
provisions and fair value gains and losses, and test if the discretionary components are priced 
differently from their non-discretionary counterparts. We find little evidence that the market 
misprices operating cash flows, non-discretionary loan loss provisions, or fair value gains and 
losses (discretionary or otherwise). However we do find evidence of significant mispricing of 
discretionary loan loss provisions. This evidence remains significant even after controlling for 
the fact that loan loss provisions are correlated with bank risk. 
 
Keywords 
Accruals, Discretionary loan provisions, Fair value gains and losses, Market efficiency 
JEL classifications: G12, M41 
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1. Introduction  
This paper examines if the market rationally prices the loan loss provision, and the fair value 
gain/loss components of reported bank net income. We also model the discretionary 
components of loan loss provisions and fair value gains and losses, and test if the 
discretionary components are priced differently from their non-discretionary counterparts.  
 
The research is in the spirit of Sloan (1996) and Xie (2001). Sloan (1996) studies the market 
pricing of the accruals of industrial firms. Xie (2001) extends Sloan (1996) by partitioning the 
accruals of industrial firms into discretionary and non-discretionary components.  
 
The main purpose of the present paper is to extend the work of Sloan and Xie to consider the 
market pricing of key components of the income statement of banks i.e. loan loss provisions 
and fair value gains and losses. We study loan loss provisions and fair value gains and losses 
because these two items explain most of the time series volatility in bank net income1
 
. In 
addition fair value accounting and loan loss provisions are two of the most discussed topics in 
accounting for banks, especially since the recent credit crunch. Given the current very high 
level of interest in accounting for banks, we believe it is of interest to know whether, and in 
what respect, the market systematically misprices either of these items.   
The paper is related to prior work that finds that the market reacts positively when banks 
increase their loan provisions (Wahlen, 1994; Beaver and Engel, 1996). These results were 
interpreted by the authors as a signalling story. High discretionary loan loss provisions were 
interpreted as the signalling of good news by bank managers. Under the assumption of an 
informationally efficient market this is the only interpretation of the results that makes any 
sense. However, another possibility, which we test in this paper, is that the positive reaction to 
high discretionary loan loss provisions is evidence of mispricing of such provisions. Our 
evidence supports the mispricing story over the signalling story.  
 
Using the discretionary loan provision literature (Kanagaretnam et al., 2004; Ryan, 2007; 
Gebhardt & Novotny-Farkas, 2011) to derive the discretionary and non-discretionary loan 
provisions, we find that the discretionary loan provisions are less persistent than non-
discretionary loan provisions and that the earnings persistence attributable to discretionary 
loan provisions is lower than that attributable to non-discretionary loan provisions.     
 
In market efficiency tests and hedge portfolio tests (Kraft et al., 2007; Xie, 2001; Sloan, 
1996), we find that the stock market over-weights loan provisions and in particular 
discretionary loan provisions. In hedge portfolio tests, investors can earn abnormal returns by 
taking long positions in banks with lower discretionary loan provisions and short positions in 
banks with higher discretionary loan provisions. This result is consistent with the 
discretionary accruals anomaly in Xie (2001).  
 
We document the relationship between risk and discretionary loan provisions. The highest 
and lowest discretionary loan provision portfolios tend to be the most risky. Thus the 
discretionary loan provision anomaly occurs in the most risky bank portfolios. A trading 
                                                     
1 In a regression of the time series standard deviation in bank net income against the time series 
standard deviation in loan provisions and the time series standard deviation in fair value gains and 
losses, the adjusted R squared is 51%.    
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strategy that buys the bank portfolio with the lowest discretionary loan provision and highest 
risk and sells the portfolio with the highest discretionary loan provision and lowest risk 
generates abnormal returns in excess of trading on either discretionary loan provision or risk 
alone. However, risk does not entirely explain the cross-sectional variation in returns to the 
high and low discretionary loan provisions based on various tests such as Khan (2008).     
  
In addition to loan loss provisions we also consider the pricing of fair value gains and losses. 
We design a model to disaggregate discretionary fair value gains and losses and non- 
discretionary fair value gains and losses. Based on this model, we find that the discretionary 
fair value gains and losses are less persistent than non-discretionary fair value gains. 
 
We then apply the stock market mispricing tests to discretionary and non-discretionary fair 
value gains and losses. In contrast to discretionary loan loss provisions we find little or no 
evidence that fair value gains and losses are mispriced.  
 
The remaining sections are organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature pertinent to 
this study. We develop the hypotheses in section 3 and outline the research design in section 
4. The empirical results are covered in section 5. Section 6 concludes.  
 
2. Literature Review  
 
The streams of literature relevant to this study straddle the accrual anomaly, loan provisions 
and fair value accounting.  
 
The seminal paper of Sloan (1996) reports evidence that rejects the null hypothesis that the 
market correctly prices accruals. In time series tests of the relative persistence of the cash 
flows and accruals components of earnings he finds that accruals are significantly less 
persistent than cash flows. He hypothesises that the market mispricing of accruals is due to 
the failure of market participants to take into account the lower persistence of accruals in their 
earnings forecasts. His empirical evidence of accruals mispricing is strongly supportive of this 
hypothesis. We extend the research in Sloan (1996) to examine if the market rationally prices 
loan loss provisions and fair value gains and losses in banks.  
2.1 Accrual anomaly   
 
Since the publication of Sloan (1996) a number of papers have questioned Sloan’s 
interpretation of his results. One stream of literature argues that the accrual anomaly arises 
due to inadequate controls for risk.  The literature that supports the risk argument include 
Khan (2008) and Wu et al. (2010). Khan (2008) reports that risk measured using a four-factor 
model based on the Intertemporal Capital Asset Pricing Model explains a substantial portion 
of the differences in returns between high and low accrual firms. Wu et al. (2010) hypothesise 
based on q-theory that firms adjust their working capital investments (i.e. accruals) in 
response to discount rate changes and that this firm behaviour is an important driver of the 
accrual anomaly. They provide evidence to support their hypothesis but they provide only a 
partial explanation of the accrual anomaly. They state that they do not intend to refute Sloan’s 
earnings fixation hypothesis but only to provide another plausible explanation for the accrual 
anomaly. We apply the mimicking portfolio methodology in Khan (2008) to our bank setting 
and find that the cross sectional variations in average returns to high and low discretionary 
loan provision banks is not explained by risk. 
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 The mimicking portfolio test result is explained further in section 2. The methodology in Wu 
et al. (2010) does not apply to banks because the drivers of bank investment behavior differ 
from that of industrial firms. We do not model bank investment behavior in this paper.  
 
While the need to control for risk is one of the key research design issue highlighted by prior 
literature, other papers point out that other research design choices can affect the inferences in 
accrual anomaly studies. There are two separate research design issues brought up in Kraft et 
al. (2006) and Kraft et al. (2007). Firstly, Kraft et al. (2007) discuss the Mishkin tests used in 
Sloan (1996). Their argument is that in the Mishkin tests, the results of the second stage 
returns equation depends on the first stage forecasting equation being correctly specified. 
When some variables are omitted in the first stage equation, they could reduce the 
significance of the variables in the second stage equation. When Kraft et al. (2007) add new 
variables such as  lagged returns and sales to the Mishkin test’s forecasting and pricing 
equations, the rational pricing of accruals is not rejected, contrary to Sloan (1996)’s 
conclusion. They also demonstrate that using OLS (ordinary least squares regression) to 
model the relation between returns and lagged accounting variables provides the same 
inferences about rational pricing as using the Mishkin test. In our study, both the OLS and the 
Mishkin tests consistently show that the market misprices discretionary loan provisions.   
 
Secondly, Kraft et al. (2006) argue that outliers/extreme observations have contributed to the 
accrual anomaly documented in Sloan (1996). Kraft et al. (2006) conduct robustness tests on 
the accrual anomaly studies. When they exclude 1% of the sample with extreme accruals, 
they find an inverted U-shaped relation between the abnormal returns and total 
accruals/discretionary accruals. This result is inconsistent with the earnings fixation theory in 
Sloan (1996). However, there are papers that question Kraft et al. (2006). Teoh and Zhang 
(2011) explain that the data trimming process in Kraft et al. (2006) creates a downward data 
truncation bias in the mean returns of right-skewed distributions when the extreme positive 
observations are legitimate. They argue that legitimate data should not be trimmed and the 
data trimming process can lead to an incorrect rejection of behaviourial explanations for the 
accrual anomaly. Other research prior to Teoh and Zhang (2011) such as Core (2006) and 
Kothari et al. (2005) also point out deleting extreme observations in skewed data can create 
biased results. This debate over the research methodologies in accrual anomaly studies is 
controversial and is not conclusive yet. We find that the conclusions of our study remain 
substantially unchanged before and after the winsorization of observations with extreme 
returns and loan provisions, and report the results using winsorized observations.   
 
While Khan (2008) and Wu et al. (2010) attempt to explain away the total accrual anomaly as 
a risk effect, other research provides further support for the accrual anomaly in Sloan (1996). 
In particular Xie (2001) shows that the accrual anomaly effect is stronger for discretionary 
accruals relative to non-discretionary accruals. Xie (2001) extends Sloan (1996) to investigate 
if the market rationally prices discretionary accruals. Discretionary accruals are the residuals 
derived from the Jones (1991) model and a few other models such as the cross-sectional 
modified Jones model (Dechow et al., 1995). She finds that the market overestimates the one-
year-ahead earnings persistence due to discretionary accruals and overprices discretionary 
accruals. She further reports that the overpricing of total accruals in Sloan (1996) is mainly 
attributable to discretionary accruals. Khan (2008) and Wu et al. (2010) evaluate the risk 
effects on total accruals, but not on discretionary accruals. On the other hand, the research 
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design debates in Kraft et al. (2006) and Teoh and Zhang (2011) relate to both total accruals 
and discretionary accruals. Our research is an extension of Xie (2001) to the loan provisions 
in banks. The model to determine discretionary loan provisions is based on the discretionary 
loan provision literature, which is covered in section 2.2.  
 
We distinguish between two streams of literature that explain the accrual anomaly. One 
stream is the general total accrual anomaly effect reported in Sloan (1996). The general total 
accrual anomaly relates to the difficulties that investors face in interpreting accrual 
information, which can exist without earnings management. It is an economics based 
explanation of the total accrual anomaly due to investor information processing deficit, as a 
result of a general failure of investors to understand the overall accruals. The other stream is 
the discretionary accrual anomaly effect documented in Xie (2001). The discretionary accrual 
anomaly is due to earnings management, in which there is a deliberate attempt by the firm to 
mislead investors. In this situation, the discretionary accrual anomaly becomes stronger when 
firms try to mislead investors and accruals become less persistent. This anomaly is due to a 
localised failure of investors to understand discretionary accruals. Many unsophisticated 
investors do not trade on the discretionary accrual anomaly and the discretionary accrual 
anomaly persists because there is less than perfect arbitrage (Battalio et al., 2012). In our 
study, the only evidence of an anomaly for banks is the discretionary loan provision anomaly 
indicating that investors have greater difficulty in understanding the discretionary loan 
provisions. This is more likely a localised failure than a generalised failure and this localised 
failure is not large enough for the key players in the market to arbitrage away. On the other 
hand, we find no evidence of discretionary fair value gain/loss anomaly. This is arguably 
because discretionary fair value gains and losses are easier to detect since unlike discretionary 
loan losses, they are more transparent.  
 
Sloan (1996) and Xie (2001) argue that the total accrual anomaly and the discretionary 
accrual anomaly are due to investor fixation on total earnings and a failure by investors to 
recognize that the accrual components of earnings have lower persistence than cash flows. In 
the present paper we find that the cash flow component of bank earnings is less persistent 
than loan loss provisions and fair value gains and losses. Thus the anomaly we find cannot be 
attributed to the lower persistence of loan loss provisions relative to cash flows. However we 
do find that discretionary loan loss provisions are less persistent than non-discretionary loan 
provisions, and that abnormal returns are generated by exploiting the lower persistence of 
discretionary loan loss provisions.  
 
Even when the investors cannot process information due to an information processing deficit, 
the market efficiency argument is that the investor processing difficulty is irrelevant if there 
are arbitrageurs. The question is why the market does not arbitrage the accrual anomaly 
away? Prior research explains that the total and discretionary accrual anomaly persists 
because there are limits to arbitrage. The large traders avoid taking positions in extreme 
accrual firms (Lev and Nissim, 2006) and even when they do, their positions are not large 
enough relative to the majority of trades to eliminate the accrual anomaly (Battalio et al., 
2012). Battalio et al. (2012) show that investors who initiate large trades respond to the 
accrual anomaly but these trades are not sufficient to substantially reduce the magnitude of 
the accrual anomaly. They find that the vast majority of investors trade based on reasons 
unrelated to accrual levels. Mashruwala et al. (2006) provide evidence that the firms which 
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exhibit an accrual anomaly have high idiosyncratic risk, low prices and low transactions. This 
result suggests that high risks and high transaction costs deter investors from taking positions 
to profit from the accrual anomaly. Lev and Nissim (2006) find that some active institutional 
investors exploit the accrual anomaly but in general, institutions and individual investors 
avoid extreme accrual firms, which are smaller, less profitable and more risky. Consistent 
with these studies, Collins et al. (2003) also show that the stock market more accurately prices 
the accrual persistence for firms with a high level of institutional owners.  
 
2.2 Bank loan provisions
This section covers the bank loan provisions literature. Prior literature use signalling as a key 
explanation for the market reaction to loan loss provisions (Elliott et al., 1991; Wahlen, 1994; 
Beaver and Engel, 1996, Liu et al., 1997).  Wahlen (1994) sets out to examine the key 
research question as to what investors learn from unexpected changes in non-performing 
loans, loan loss provisions and loan charge-offs. Loan loss provisions incorporate the 
managerial expectations of loan losses and a discretionary element. He argues that unexpected 
changes in non-performing loans and unexpected loan charge-offs are correlated with non-
discretionary unexpected future loan losses and unexpected loan losses of the current period 
respectively and investors can estimate the discretionary component of unexpected loan loss 
provisions. He shows that unexpected changes in non-performing loans and unexpected loan 
charge-offs are negatively related to stock returns and future cash flows. In addition, Wahlen 
finds that after conditioning for the unexpected increase in non-performing loans and loan 
charge-offs, there is a positive relationship between unexpected loan losses and returns as 
well as between unexpected loan losses and future cash flows. He interprets this result as 
evidence that the stock market interprets higher discretionary loan loss provisions as 
managers signalling private ‘good news’ information. This conclusion assumes market 
efficiency. In contrast, our study demonstrates that the market misprices loan loss provisions 
using the methodologies in Sloan (1996) and Xie (2001).  
    
 
In contrast to the signaling study of Wahlen a number of studies argue that banks use 
discretionary loan provisions opportunistically to manage reported earnings and capital. Ma 
(1988) provides early evidence that banks smooth income using loan provisions by increasing 
loan provisions when the operating income is higher. Banks also target a loan provision level 
to meet the regulatory capital requirement by increasing loan provisions when the current loan 
charge-off is higher. Collins et al. (1995) investigates how the capital, earnings and tax 
decisions of banks affect their seven capital raising options: securities gains and losses, loan 
provisions, loan charge-offs, capital notes, common stock, preferred stock and dividends. 
They estimate bank specific regressions for each capital raising option on the regulatory 
capital, earnings and marginal tax rates and provide evidence that banks differ in their 
responsiveness to capital, earnings and tax incentives. They also provide evidence that US 
banks use loan provisions to manage earnings and capital. Beatty et al. (1995) differ from 
Collins et al. (1995) by using simultaneous equations to investigate five capital raising 
options: loan provisions, loan loss charge-offs, pension settlement, miscellaneous gains and 
losses and issuances of new securities. They show that loan provisions, loan loss charge-offs 
and issuances of new securities are used to managed regulatory capital.  
 
Moyer (1990) hypothesises that banks with capital that falls below the regulatory minimum 
seek to reduce regulatory costs by adjusting loan loss provisions in order to increase capital. 
She finds evidence to support this hypothesis. Ahmed et al. (1999) make use of the 1990 
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change in bank capital regulation to test the banks’ use of loan provisions to manage capital 
and earnings. In 1990, the bank capital regulations were changed such that loan loss 
provisions no longer count as Tier 1 capital and count as total capital limited to 1.25% of risk 
weighted assets. Ahmed et al. hypothesise that this regulation change reduces (increases) the 
incentive to manage capital (earnings) using loan provisions and find strong evidence to 
support the capital management hypothesis but no evidence to support the earnings 
management hypothesis. Kanagaretnam et al. (2004) examine the different situations when 
loan provisions are used for earnings management motives. They hypothesise that managers 
of banks with pre-managed earnings that deviate more (less) from the median are more (less) 
likely to smooth earnings using loan provisions and find evidence that support this 
hypothesis. In this paper, we find that discretionary loan provisions are less persistent and 
lead to lower earnings persistence relative to non-discretionary loan provisions, consistent 
with the use of discretionary loan provisions for earnings and capital management purposes 
documented in prior literature.  
 
Relative to academic literature, there have been significantly more debates on the topic of 
loan loss accounting in the professional practitioner arena among regulators, accounting 
standard setters and banks. IAS 39 and US GAAP currently use an incurred loan loss 
accounting approach in which loan losses are recognized when there is objective evidence of 
the loss event such as the bankruptcy of a borrower (IASB, 2009).  The present incurred loan 
loss accounting standards have been severely criticized for delaying the recognition of loan 
losses and causing the financial crisis (Turner, 2010). The IASB and the FASB have been 
working jointly to replace the existing accounting standard with one that takes into account 
expected loan provisions. However, the accounting standard setters disagree among 
themselves on the conceptual approach to determine expected loan provisions. For example, 
the IASB approach is to recognise the credit losses of the good loan book over the life of the 
loans based on a time-proportional amount of remaining lifetime expected credit losses, and 
to recognise the credit losses of the bad loan book as the full amount of the remaining lifetime 
expected credit losses. On the other hand, the FASB approach is to recognise expected credit 
losses for the foreseeable future for both good and bad loan books (IFRS Foundation, 2011). 
The definitions of the terms such as 'foreseeable future' and 'expected credit losses' are being 
debated as well. The IASB and the FASB are at present still trying to reach a consensus on 
the approach even while European policy makers and banks also have their own views on the 
right approach. Our research results show that consistent with the fact that loan loss 
accounting is a difficult to understand topic with much disagreement and controversy, the 
market is not able to understand and to price the bank loan provisions especially the 
discretionary loan provisions correctly.      
 
Prior fair value accounting literature show that fair values are value-relevant (Barth, 1994; 
Barth et al., 1996; Venkatachalam, 1996; Ahmed et al., 2006) and there is little evidence that 
the market misprices fair value gains and losses. Barth (1994) reports evidence that fair values 
gains and losses provide incremental explanatory power to realized gains and losses under 
certain model specifications. Barth et al. (1996) find that the differences between the market 
values and equity book values can be explained by differences between the disclosed fair 
value estimates and the book values of loans, securities and long term debt. Venkatachalam 
(1996) finds that the disclosed fair values of derivatives explain the cross-sectional variation 
2.3 Fair value accounting  
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in bank stock prices and provide incremental explanatory power over the notional values of 
derivatives. Ahmed et al. (2006) make use of the expanded derivative fair value disclosures 
prior to SFAS 133 and the recognition of derivative fair values after SFAS 133 to study if the 
investor valuation of derivatives depends on whether the derivatives are recognised or 
disclosed. They demonstrate that the valuation coefficients on recognized derivatives are 
significant but not that of disclosed derivatives. Our research finds little evidence that fair 
value gains and losses are mispriced by the market, a result that is consistent with the prior 
literature on the value relevance of fair value gains and losses.  
   
If fair values are less reliable than historical costs, fair value gains and losses would cause 
earnings to become less persistent. Furthermore, if the conclusion in Richardson et al. (2005) 
that less reliable accruals are mispriced more by the market applies to banks, fair value gains 
and losses would be mispriced by the market but we find evidence to the contrary.  In a BIS 
working paper, Landsman (2006) cites examples from Barth et al. (1998) and Aboody et al. 
(2005) to illustrate the situations when fair value accounting becomes more difficult and leads 
to lower reliability of fair values. In one example, Barth et al. (1998) estimate the fair values 
of corporate bonds and its components such as conversion, call and put features using a 
binomial option pricing model. They find that the model estimates of the values of bonds that 
are not publicly traded lack reliability. The reason is that these values change significantly 
depending on whether the bonds with available market prices which can be used as inputs to 
the models are included in the sample. In another example, Aboody et al. (2005) document 
evidence that managers manipulate disclosed employee stock option fair values by their 
choices of model inputs. Our study shows that the discretionary fair value gains and losses are 
less persistent than the non-discretionary fair value gains and losses but the market does not 
misprice fair value gains and losses (discretionary or otherwise).  
 
US GAAP FAS157 establishes three hierarchical levels of fair value measurements (Epstein 
et al., 2008). Level one involves the case of assets for which there are quoted prices in active 
markets. Level two assets require the use of observable inputs for valuation. Level three 
involves assets that have no observable actual transaction prices available as inputs for the 
valuation. Fair valuation here is often based on theoretical models for which assumptions 
need to be made about the value of key model parameters. Song et al. (2010) find that the 
value relevance decreases for the level three assets relative to levels one and two assets. 
Mispricing is more likely for the level three assets than for levels one and two assets. 
However, there are insufficient data on the different levels of assets to carry out this test in 
our study because FAS157 becomes effective in 2007.    
   
Some financial assets and liabilities such as available-for-sale securities are required to be 
recognized at amortized cost under the accounting rules.  US GAAP FAS159 provides an 
option (called fair value option) for firms to elect such assets and liabilities for fair valuation 
to eliminate accounting mismatches.  There is some evidence of earnings management in the 
use of the fair value option by the early adopters (Henry, 2009; Song, 2008). On the other 
hand, Chang et al. (2011) and Fiechter (2010) show that the regular fair value option adopters 
choose the fair value option accounting to reduce accounting mismatches and not to manage 
earnings. In our study, there are insufficient data on the fair value option gains and losses to 
test if they are mispriced, because FAS159 becomes effective in 2007.  
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3. Hypotheses Development 
We develop the hypotheses largely following the approach in Richardson et al. (2005). 
Hypotheses 1a to 1d relate to the persistence of the different earnings components: operating 
cash flow, loan provision (total, discretionary and non-discretionary) and fair value gains and 
losses (total, discretionary and non-discretionary). Hypotheses 2a to 2d cover the market 
mispricing tests of the same earnings components. Hypotheses 3a to 3d underline the 
directional and economic significance of the market mispricing by using a trading strategy to 
generate abnormal returns from the mispricing.  
 
Sloan (1996) finds that accruals are less persistent than operating cash flows. The accrual 
items in our bank setting, loan provisions and fair value gains and losses constitute significant 
components of bank earnings. Nonetheless, operating cash flows from bank financial assets 
can be volatile because they include the principal cash flows for financial assets, which 
fluctuate from one period to another and are not persistent. This is consistent with the finding 
in Dechow et al. (2008) that not all components of operating cash flows are highly persistent. 
Furthermore, Richardson et al. (2005) classify financial assets including loans and fair valued 
assets as being accruals of high reliability.  Given the uncertainties, whether the persistence of 
operating cash flows differs from that of loan provisions and fair value gains and losses is an 
empirical question and we test this in hypotheses 1a and 1b.  
 
H1a (Null):  
There is no difference in the persistence of the operating cash flow and loan provision 
components of earnings.  
 
H1a (Alternative):  
There is a difference in the persistence of the operating cash flow and loan provision 
components of earnings. 
 
H1b (Null):  
There is no difference in the persistence of the operating cash flow and the fair value gain/loss 
components of earnings.   
 
H1b (Alternative):  
There is a difference in the persistence of the operating cash flow and the fair value gain/loss 
components of earnings.  
 
It is an empirical question to be tested whether the operating cash flows from bank financial 
assets are more persistent than discretionary loan provisions and non-discretionary loan 
provisions. On the other hand, the economic (non-discretionary) components of the loan 
provisions are likely to be more persistent then the discretionary element. This is because 
prior literature on loan provision covered in section 2.2 provides evidence that the 
discretionary loan provisions can be managed for capital and earnings purposes. When 
discretionary loan provisions are used for capital and earnings management, they are expected 
to be less reliable than non-discretionary loan provisions and are expected to lead to lower 
earnings persistence, following Richardson et al. (2005). This leads to hypothesis 1c.    
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H1c (Null):  
(i) There is no difference in the persistence of the operating cash flows and the  
discretionary loan provisions.  
(ii) There is no difference in the persistence of the operating cash flows and the non- 
discretionary loan provisions.  
(iii) There is no difference in the persistence of the discretionary and the non- 
discretionary loan provisions.  
 
H1c (Alternative):  
(i) There is a difference in the persistence of the operating cash flows and the discretionary 
loan provisions.  
(ii) There is a difference in the persistence of the operating cash flows and the non-
discretionary loan provisions.  
(iii) The persistence of non-discretionary loan provisions is higher than the persistence of 
discretionary loan provisions.  
 
The discretionary fair values have a greater potential than non-discretionary fair values to be 
manipulated, but prior studies have provided little evidence of discretionary fair values being 
manipulated. Unlike discretionary loan provisions, discretionary fair value gains and losses 
are more transparent and any manipulation can be more easily detected. Thus, whether there 
is a difference in the persistence of operating cash flows, discretionary and non-discretionary 
fair value gains and losses is an empirical question. We test this in hypothesis 1d. 
 
H1d (Null):  
(i) There is no difference in the persistence of the operating cash flow and the  
discretionary fair value gain/loss.  
(ii) There is no difference in the persistence of the operating cash flow and the non-
discretionary fair value gain/loss.  
(iii) There is no difference in the persistence of the discretionary fair value gain/loss and the 
non-discretionary fair value gain/loss.  
 
H1d (Alternative):  
(i) There is a difference in the persistence of the operating cash flow and the discretionary 
fair value gain/loss. 
(ii) There is a difference in the persistence of the operating cash flow and the non-
discretionary fair value gain/loss.  
(iii) There is a difference in the persistence of the discretionary fair value gain/loss and the 
non-discretionary fair value gain/loss.  
 
Prior literature provides evidence that accruals in industrial firms are mispriced by the stock 
market (Sloan, 1996; Collins and Hribar, 2000). The key question we want to investigate is 
whether the same phenomenon exists in banks. For industrial firms, the accruals are largely 
driven by changes in sales, current account receivables, account payables and properties, plant 
and equipment. For banks, a key component of accruals in bank financial statements is loan 
provisions. If the loan provisions are less persistent than operating cash flows and the same 
stock market mispricing of accruals in industrial firms also occur in the bank loan provisions,  
the bank stock prices would over-estimate the persistence of loan provisions. However, there 
are uncertainties in the persistence of loan provisions relative to operating cash flows in 
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hypothesis 1a. Thus we make no prediction on whether the null would be rejected in 
hypothesis 2a. 
 
H2a (Null):  
The bank stock prices reflect correctly the persistence of loan provisions.  
 
H2a (Alternative):  
The bank stock prices over-estimate the persistence of loan provisions.  
 
We also examine if there is market mispricing of fair values. The value relevance studies 
(Barth, 1994; Barth et al., 1996, Eccher et al., 1996, Venkatachalam, 1996, Nelson, 1996, 
Ahmed et al., 2006) provide evidence that the stock market captures fair values on investment 
securities, loans, deposits and off-balance sheet instruments such as derivatives accurately. 
Based on these studies, we expect the stock market to properly price the fair value gains and 
losses and not to reject the null of hypothesis 2b.   
 
H2b (Null):  
The bank stock prices reflect correctly the persistence of fair value gains and losses.  
 
H2b (Alternative):  
The bank stock prices do not reflect correctly the persistence of fair value gains and losses.   
 
Next, we extend the study to determine if the mispricing of discretionary accruals detected in 
Xie (2001) also applies to discretionary loan provisions in banks. The discretionary accrual 
anomaly in Xie (2001) demonstrates that when firms manage earnings, the information 
processing becomes more difficult and the market is more likely to misprice the discretionary 
accruals relative to the non-discretionary accruals. The literature covered in section 2.2 gives 
evidence of banks using discretionary loan provisions to smooth income and to manage 
capital. In these situations, when earnings surprises are positive, the banks would increase 
discretionary loan provisions to reduce earnings. The higher (more negative) discretionary 
loan provisions now would reverse in the future and lead to future positive abnormal returns. 
Based on the evidence in Richardson et al. (2005) that the less reliable accruals are mispriced 
more by the market than the more reliable accruals, we expect the market to over-estimate the 
persistence of discretionary loan provisions in banks and this leads to discretionary loan 
provisions being mispriced.  
 
In contrast to the behaviourial explanations in Sloan (1996) and Xie (2001), the signalling 
theory in the loan provision literature assumes market efficiency. Wahlen (1994) finds that 
the stock market reacts positively to discretionary loan provisions and deduces that the stock 
market interprets higher discretionary loan provisions as bank managers signalling private 
good news information on higher future positive cash flows. This positive relation between 
discretionary loan provisions and stock market prices is supported by Beaver and Engel 
(1996). The signalling theory in Wahlen (1994) assumes that the market is efficient and does 
not misprice discretionary loan provisions. There is a tension between the signalling theory 
and the market mispricing theory on the relation between discretionary loan provision and 
returns.  
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We predict that the discretionary accrual anomaly in Xie (2001) extends to the bank setting 
and hypothesise that the stock market over-values the discretionary loan provisions, but we 
are uncertain as to whether the market misprices the non-discretionary loan provisions. This 
leads to hypothesis 2c.    
 
H2c (Null):  
(i) The bank stock prices reflect correctly the persistence of discretionary loan  
provisions.  
(ii) The bank stock prices reflect correctly the persistence of non-discretionary loan  
provisions.  
 
H2c (Alternative):  
(i)  The bank stock prices over-estimate the persistence of discretionary loan provisions.  
(ii) The bank stock prices do not reflect correctly the persistence of non-discretionary loan 
provisions.  
 
We next examine if the market misprices discretionary and non-discretionary fair value gains 
and losses. The non-discretionary fair value gains and losses is the economic component of 
fair values that are driven by market factors including short and long term interest rates 
(Barth, 1994), US dollar exchange rates (Ahmed et al., 2011) and corporate bond index. The 
discretionary fair value gains and losses are the component of fair values not driven by these 
market factors (refer to equation 2 in the Methodology section 4.1 on the derivation of   
discretionary and non-discretionary fair value gains and losses). There is little prior evidence 
on whether discretionary fair value gains and losses are manipulated. Based on the value 
relevance studies, the pricing should correctly capture any differences in earnings persistence 
due to discretionary and non-discretionary fair value gain and losses and we should expect not 
to reject the null of hypothesis 2d.   
 
H2d (Null):  
(i) The bank stock prices reflect correctly the persistence of discretionary fair value gains 
and losses.  
(ii) The bank stock prices reflect correctly the persistence of non-discretionary fair value 
gains and losses.  
 
H2d (Alternative):  
(i) The bank stock prices do not reflect correctly the persistence of discretionary fair value 
gains and losses. 
(ii) The bank stock prices do not reflect correctly the persistence of non-discretionary fair 
value gains and losses.  
 
Following Sloan (1996) and Xie (2001), we carry out hedge portfolio tests on the economic 
significance and direction of any mispricing in hypotheses 3a to 3d. If the loan provisions 
and/or fair value gains and losses are mispriced, the investors should be able to exploit this 
mispricing by buying (selling) the bank stocks which are under-weighted (over-weighted) by 
the stock market. Given that in hypothesis 2a we are uncertain as to whether the market over-
estimates the persistence of loan provisions, we make no prediction in hypothesis 3a.  
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H3a (Null):  
A trading strategy taking a long position in the stock of banks reporting lower loan provisions 
and a short position in the stock of banks reporting higher loan provisions does not generate 
positive abnormal stock returns.     
 
H3a (Alternative):  
A trading strategy taking a long position in the stock of banks reporting lower loan provisions 
and a short position in the stock of banks reporting higher loan provisions generates positive 
abnormal stock returns.     
 
On the other hand, we do not expect market mispricing of fair value gains and losses in 
hypothesis 2b. Thus we expect not to reject hypothesis 3b.  
 
H3b (Null):  
A trading strategy taking a long position in the stock of banks reporting higher fair value 
gains and a short position in the stock of banks reporting lower fair value gains does not 
generate abnormal stock returns.   
 
H3b (Alternative):  
A trading strategy taking a long position in the stock of banks reporting higher fair value 
gains and a short position in the stock of banks reporting lower fair value gains generates 
abnormal stock returns.   
 
We expect the market to over-estimate the persistence of discretionary loan provisions, but 
make no prediction on the non-discretionary loan provisions in hypothesis 2c. Thus, the 
investors are expected to profit from buying stocks with low discretionary loan provisions and 
selling stocks with high discretionary loan provisions. We make no prediction on whether the 
same hedge portfolio strategy on non-discretionary loan provisions yields positive abnormal 
returns. This is stated in hypothesis 3c.  
 
H3c (Null):  
(i) A trading strategy taking a long position in the stock of banks reporting lower 
discretionary loan provisions and a short position in the stock of banks reporting higher 
discretionary loan provisions does not generate positive abnormal stock returns.  
(ii) A trading strategy taking a long position in the stock of banks reporting lower non-
discretionary loan provisions and a short position in the stock of banks reporting higher non-
discretionary loan provisions does not generate positive abnormal stock returns.  
 
H3c (Alternative):  
(i) A trading strategy taking a long position in the stock of banks reporting lower 
discretionary loan provisions and a short position in the stock of banks reporting higher 
discretionary loan provisions generates positive abnormal stock returns.  
(ii) A trading strategy taking a long position in the stock of banks reporting lower non-
discretionary loan provisions and a short position in the stock of banks reporting higher non-
discretionary loan provisions generates positive abnormal stock returns.  
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For discretionary and non-discretionary fair value gains and losses, our prediction in 
hypotheses 2d is that there is no market mispricing. Hence, we expect the same trading 
strategy not to generate abnormal returns and do not expect to reject the null of hypothesis 3d.   
 
H3d (Null):  
(i) A trading strategy taking a long position in the stock of banks reporting higher 
discretionary fair value gains and a short position in the stock of banks reporting lower 
discretionary fair value gains does not generate abnormal stock returns.     
(ii) A trading strategy taking a long position in the stock of banks reporting higher non-
discretionary fair value gains and a short position in the stock of banks reporting lower non-
discretionary fair value gains does not generate abnormal stock returns.     
 
H3d (Alternative):  
(i) A trading strategy taking a long position in the stock of banks reporting higher 
discretionary fair value gains and a short position in the stock of banks reporting lower 
discretionary fair value gains generates abnormal stock returns.     
(ii) A trading strategy taking a long position in the stock of banks reporting higher non-
discretionary fair value gains and a short position in the stock of banks reporting lower non-
discretionary fair value gains generates abnormal stock returns.     
 
4. Research Design 
In this section, we explain the methodologies to disaggregate discretionary and non-
discretionary loan provisions, to disaggregate discretionary and non-discretionary fair value 
gains and losses and the market mispricing tests in Sloan (1996), Xie (2001) and Kraft et al. 
(2007).   
4.1 Methodology 
 
The equation to derive discretionary loan provisions follows prior literature (Beaver and 
Engel, 1996; Kanagaretnam et al., 2004; Ryan, 2007; Gebhardt & Novotny-Farkas, 2011) and 
is stated as follows:
Discretionary and non-discretionary loan provision equation   
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The variables LLA, NPL, ∆NPL, ∆LOAN and Chargeoff control for the non-discretionary 
components of the loans. α2, α3 and α5 are expected to be negative because loan loss 
provisions should be  more negative when the non-performing loan level is higher, when there 
is an increase in non-performing loans and when loan charge-offs are higher. Current loan 
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charge-offs provide information about future loan defaults and hence should relate negatively 
to loan provisions (Beaver and Engel, 1996). The loan provision is shown in the same 
direction as that in the prior accrual anomaly papers by Xie (2001) and Sloan (1996): higher 
(lower) loan provisions refer to a decrease (increase) in loan loss allowance between prior 
year and current year. The loan provision is drawn from the income statement account so as to 
avoid the measurement errors in estimating accruals which can be introduced when accruals 
are measured as the change in successive balance sheet accounts (Hribar and Collins, 2002).   
 
Equation 1 is run for each year on the entire Bank Compustat sample with data available for 
all variables in the equation. This is similar to the way the discretionary accrual model in 
Jones (1991) is implemented in Xie (2001). The residuals and predicted values from the 
equation are the discretionary loan provisions and non-discretionary loan provisions 
respectively.  
 
We next design an equation to derive the discretionary fair value gains and losses and non-
discretionary fair value gains and losses by regressing fair value gains and losses on market 
factors and exposures. The key market rates that influence the banks’ fair value gains and 
losses include long term interest rates, foreign exchange rates, short term interest rates and 
corporate bond rates. These are the economic (non-discretionary) components of fair value 
gains and losses. The market factors used in our model are 10 year US dollar treasury bond 
rates (Barth, 1994), US Nominal Broad Dollar Index by the Federal Reserve (Ahmed et al., 
2011), Federal Reserve fund rates to measure short term interest rates and Dow Jones 
Corporate Bond Index to measure the corporate bond yields. We identify the main fair value 
exposure data available in Bank Compustat as investment security assets and trading assets. 
Equation 2 to derive the discretionary and non-discretionary fair value gains and losses is 
stated as follows:  
Discretionary and non-discretionary fair value gain and loss equation   
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Equation 2 is estimated for all banks from Bank Compustat with data available for all 
variables in the equation. The residuals and predicted values from the equation are the 
discretionary and non-discretionary fair value gains and losses respectively.  
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Mishkin (1983) develops a framework to test the rational expectations hypothesis in 
macroeconomics (hereafter the Mishkin test). The application of Mishkin tests in Sloan 
(1996) and Xie (2001) are adapted in our studies with the following equations:  
The Mishkin test 
 
NIt+1 = α0 + α1CFOt + α2LLrest+ α3LLpret+ α4FVrest + α5FVpret + α6Returnvolt + υ  t+1 
 
(3) 
Areturnst+1 = γ+β(NIt+1 - α0 - α1*CFOt - α2*LLrest- α3*LLpret- α4*FVrest - α5*FVpret
                       α
 -    
6
*Returnvolt) + ε
NI
 t+1                                                                                                (4) 
t+1 = net income at time t+1; CFOt= operating cash flows at time t; LLrest = discretionary 
loan provisions at time t; LLpret = non-discretionary loan provisions at time t; FVrest = 
discretionary fair value gains and losses at time t; FVpret = non-discretionary fair value gains 
and losses at time t; Returnvolt = risk measured by return volatility at time t based on Laeven 
and Levine (2009); Areturnst+1 
The bank return is the change in market value from prior year to current year, divided by the 
prior year market value. The buy-and-hold bank returns are computed beginning six months 
after the fiscal year-end through the sixth month of the subsequent year (e.g. July 1, 2001 
through June 30, 2002 for a firm reporting December 31, 2000). The abnormal return is the 
difference between the buy-and-hold bank return and the market value-weighted bank return.  
= abnormal returns at time t+1. 
 
Equation (3) is a forecasting equation that estimates the forecasting coefficients (αs) of 
operating cash flows, discretionary loan provisions, non-discretionary loan provisions, 
discretionary fair value gains and losses, non-discretionary fair value gains and losses and 
return volatilities for predicting one-year-ahead earnings. Equation (4) is a valuation equation 
that estimates the valuation coefficients (α*
 
s) that the market assigns to the same earnings 
components. Equations (3) and (4) are estimated using the nonlinear generalized least squares 
estimation procedure using two stages. 
In the first stage, equations (3) and (4) are estimated without imposing any constraints on the 
αs and the α*s. In the second stage, to test if the valuation coefficients differ significantly from 
the forecasting coefficients, the rational pricing constraints that αq = αq* (q=1 to 6) are 
imposed. This constraint requires that stock prices correctly anticipate the performance of 
earnings persistence. Mishkin shows that the following likelihood ratio statistic is 
asymptotically χ2
 
(q) distributed under the null hypothesis that the market rationally prices the 
earnings components according to their associations with one-year-ahead earnings.       
    2NLn(SSRc /SSRu
 
) 
q = number of rational pricing constraints imposed 
N = number of sample observations 
Ln = natural logarithm operator 
SSRc 
SSR
= the sum of squared residuals from the constrained regressions in the second stage 
u
 
= the sum of squared residuals from the unconstrained regressions in the first stage 
The hypothesis that the market rationally prices one or more earnings components (i.e. αq = 
αq
*
 
, q=1 to 6) is rejected if the likelihood ratio statistic is sufficiently large.  
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Kraft et al. (2007) suggest that using the ordinary least squares regression to regress future 
returns on the cash flows and accruals would give similar inferences as the Mishkin tests. We 
apply the methodology in Kraft et al. (2007) and regress one-year ahead abnormal returns on 
current operating cash flows, discretionary loan provisions, non-discretionary loan provisions, 
discretionary fair value gains and losses, non-discretionary fair value gains and losses and 
risk, in addition to using the Mishkin tests. 
 
The sample covers all US listed banks in Bank Compustat. The sample period is 1996 to 
2009. The accounting data on net income, loan provisions, fair value gains and losses and 
operating cash flows are obtained from Bank Compustat. The operating cash data (Bank 
Compustat item “Operating Activities – Net Cash Flow”) in Bank Compustat is limited to the 
period 2004 to 2009. Additional operating cash data are hand-collected from the regulatory 
filing 10k reports in the SEC Edgar database, consistent with the process in Ryan et al. 
(2006). The loan provision is data item ‘Provision for credit loss’ in Bank Compustat. The fair 
value gains and losses are the sum of investment securities gains and losses (Bank Compustat 
data item “Investment securities gain (loss) Total”) and trading gains and losses (Bank 
Compustat data item “Trading/Dealing securities gain (loss)”). The loan provisions and fair 
value gains and losses are income statement items instead of being derived from changes in 
balance sheet positions to avoid the measurement problems documented in Hribar and Collins 
(2002). The earnings components are scaled by beginning total assets.    
4.2 Sample selection   
 
The bank stock price and share outstanding data to calculate bank market values and bank 
stock returns are extracted from CRSP database. The daily stock returns to calculate return 
volatility are sourced from CRSP database. We use all the banks in Bank Compustat with 
bank stock prices to calculate the market value weighted returns used to calculate abnormal 
returns. 
 
Based on the above selection criteria, the overall sample size over the 14 year period from 
1996 to 2009 to run equations 3 and 4 are 4476. This is an average of 320 banks per year, 
from a lowest of 128 in 1996 to a highest of 442 in 2009. The number of bank observations 
increases over the years because the accounting and market data becomes more available in 
later years. Firms that are delisted, become bankrupt or merged in later years are included in 
the sample to avoid survivorship bias. Missing returns are set to zero based on the 
methodology in Kraft et al. (2006) to avoid selection bias because they find that banks with 
missing returns typically exhibit poor earnings performance. The movements in the sample 
across years are shown in appendix A.   
 
The data on loan loss allowances, non-performing loans, loan loss charge-offs and loans to 
run equation 1 are hand-collected from either the regulatory filing 10k report, annual report or 
Compustat database. In order to run equation 2, the accounting data on investment securities 
and trading assets are sourced from Computat while the market data on 10 year US dollar 
treasury bond rates, US nominal broad dollar index, Federal Reserve fund rates and Dow 
Jones corporate bond index are obtained from Datastream. The equations (1) and (2) are run 
based on all available data, which give sample sizes of 10042 and 8261 respectively.   
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5. Empirical Results 
Table 2 panel A provides the descriptive statistics of the key variables. In our bank sample, 
the mean total return is -5.7%, the mean net income is 0.7% of total assets and the mean 
operating cash flow is 1.3% of total assets. On the other hand, in Xie (2001), the total return is 
15.1%, average net income is 2.5% of total assets and average operating cash flow is 6.9% of 
total assets. The differences are that our bank sample covers 1996 to 2009 while Xie (2001) 
examines industrial firms for the period 1971 to 1992. The low average return, net income 
and operating cash flow of our bank sample is largely attributable to the financial crisis years 
2008 and 2009. From the mean operating cash flow and the mean net income in table 2, we 
can derive the operating cash flow as a percentage of net income to be  1.8 (1.3%/0.7%) for 
banks. From the mean operating cash flow and the mean net income in Xie (2001), we 
estimate the operating cash flow as a percentage of net income to be 2.8 (6.9%/2.5%) for 
industrial firms. This shows that the operating cash flow as a proportion of net income is 
lower in banks than in industrial firms.  
5.1 Descriptive statistics and correlations 
 
     [Insert Table 2] 
 
The loan provision is 0.4% of total assets and has a standard deviation of 0.6%, compared to 
the average of about 0.74% of total assets in Kanagaretnam et al. (2004). The difference is 
likely because Kanagaretnam et al. (2004) covers a different time period of 1980 to 1997. On 
the other hand, the average fair value gains and losses from investment securities and trading 
assets in our bank sample are 0.02% of total assets. The average discretionary loan provision 
and non-discretionary loan provision are 0.01% and 0.4% of total assets respectively. 
Although the average discretionary loan provision is small, the absolute magnitude (not 
tabulated here) is 29% of net income. The latter is larger than the average 16% of earnings for 
discretionary accruals in the industrial firm sample of Xie (2001) and demonstrates the 
significance of discretionary loan provisions.   
 
Panels B and C report the statistics of variables used in the discretionary loan provision and 
discretionary fair value gain/loss equations (equations (1) and (2) in section 4.1) respectively.  
The loan loss allowances and non-performing loans are 0.9% and 1% of total assets 
respectively. The non-performing loans are higher than loan loss allowances because non-
performing loans generally include past due loans which may not be classified as loan loss 
allowances. The average loan loss charge-off is very small but its maximum is 1.5% of total 
assets. The investment securities are significantly higher than trading assets.   
 
Table 3 panel A reports the correlations for the variables in the main regression tests. The 
correlations of net income with operating cash flows, fair value gains and losses and total loan 
provisions are 0.13, 0.17 and 0.40 respectively. This provides evidence that the earning 
performance of banks is more closely related to the loan provisions and fair value gains and 
losses, rather than operating cash flows. The correlation of returns with net income is positive 
while the correlation of returns with loan provisions is negative.  
 
     [Insert Table 3] 
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When we disaggregate loan provisions and fair value gains and losses into discretionary and 
non-discretionary components, the correlations of net income with the non-discretionary 
components are larger than that with the discretionary components. The correlation between 
net income and non-discretionary loan provisions is higher than that between net income and 
discretionary loan provisions. This result is consistent with the last column of table 7. The last 
column of table 7 shows the results from regression of net income on lagged operating cash 
flows, lagged discretionary loan provisions, lagged non-discretionary loan provisions, lagged 
discretionary fair value gains and losses and non-discretionary fair value gains and losses. In 
this regression of table 7, the coefficient of lagged non-discretionary loan provisions is higher 
than the coefficient of discretionary loan provisions.   
 
At the same time, the correlation between net income and non-discretionary fair value gains 
and losses is higher than that between net income and discretionary fair value gains and 
losses. This result is also consistent with the last column of table 7, which shows that the 
coefficient of non-discretionary fair value gains and losses is higher than the coefficient of 
discretionary fair value gains and losses.  
 
In addition, the negative correlation between return volatility and non-discretionary loan 
provisions shows that the economic components of loan provisions are negatively related to 
risk. This negative relationship between return volatility and non-discretionary loan 
provisions is further illustrated in table 12 
 
Table 3 panels B and C report the correlations for the variables in the discretionary loan 
provision regressions and the discretionary fair value gain/loss regressions respectively. The 
loan provisions are highly negatively correlated with the components non-performing loans 
(level and change) and loan loss charge-offs, as predicted in equation 1. The highly 
statistically significant correlations show that the levels and changes of non-performing loans 
and loan loss charge-offs are strong drivers of loan provisions, a point further supported by 
table 4. The positive correlation of fair value gains and losses with the lagged fair value gains 
and losses is statistically significant, consistent with the persistence of fair value gains and 
losses, which is further demonstrated in table 6 panel B. Fair value gains and losses are also 
positively correlated with investment securities, trading assets, US nominal broad dollar index 
and Dow Jones corporate bond index in equation 2.         
 
5.2. Main results  
This section reports the results of equations 1 and 2 in section 4.1 that are used to derive the 
discretionary and non-discretionary components of loan provisions and fair value gains and 
losses. The results for the discretionary loan provision equation are reported in table 4. The 
coefficients of non-performing loans and loan loss charge-offs are negative and statistically 
significant, consistent with the predictions based on prior literature (Kanagaretnam et al., 
2004, Gebhardt and Novotny-Farkas, 2011). The average of the adjusted R squared over the 
1996-2009 period is 31%, higher than the 23% in Jones (1991) discretionary accrual model.   
Derivation of discretionary loan provisions and discretionary fair value gains and losses  
 
     [Insert Table 4] 
 
The results for the discretionary fair value gain and loss equation are reported in table 5. The 
positive coefficient of lagged fair value gains and losses shows that fair value gains and losses 
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are persistent. The fair value gains and losses are positively related to the corporate bond 
index, the long term interest rates (10 year US government bond rates) and US dollar 
exchange rates but are negatively related to the short term interest rates (Federal Reserve fund 
interest rates). The investment securities give higher fair value gains when US dollar 
strengthens against other currencies (positive coefficient of the interaction between Invtsec 
and USDexch). The investment securities and trading assets yield higher fair value gains 
when the corporate bond index increases which indicate an improvement in bond credit risks 
(positive coefficients of the interactions between Invtsec and Corpindex and between 
Tradasset and Corpindex). The second column of table 5 shows that the adjusted R squared of 
the discretionary fair value gain and loss model is 21%., which is close to the 23% R squared 
in Jones (1991) discretionary accrual model.    
 
     [Insert Table 5] 
 
The persistence of operating cash flows, loan provisions (total, discretionary and non-
discretionary) and fair value gains and losses (total, discretionary and non-discretionary) are 
reported in table 6 panels A and B. The persistence of the total loan provisions and the non-
discretionary loan provisions are both higher than the persistence of operating cash flows, 
hence any loan provision anomaly detected cannot be attributed to the lower persistence of 
loan provisions relative to operating cash flows. The result rejects the null hypothesis 1a that 
there is no difference in the persistence of operating cash flows and total loan provisions. This 
result also rejects the null hypothesis 1c(ii) that there is no difference in the persistence of 
operating cash flows and non-discretionary loan provisions.   
Persistence Tests 
 
     [Insert Table 6] 
 
The coefficient of the non-discretionary loan provisions is substantially higher than that of the 
discretionary loan provisions, a result which is consistent with Xie (2001). This result 
provides evidence to support the alternative of hypothesis 1c(iii) that the persistence of non-
discretionary loan provisions is higher than the persistence of discretionary loan provisions. 
The lower persistence of discretionary loan provisions than non-discretionary loan provisions 
is likely attributable to the use of discretionary loan provisions for earnings management and 
capital management ((Ma, 1988; Moyer, 1990; Collins et al., 1995; Beatty et al., 1995; 
Ahmed et al., 1999; Kanagaretnam et al., 2004).  
 
On the other hand, the persistence of discretionary loan provisions and the operating cash 
flows are similar, giving little evidence to reject the null hypothesis 1c(i) that there is no 
difference in the persistence of the operating cash flows and the discretionary loan provisions. 
 
The total and the non-discretionary fair value gains and losses are more persistent than the 
operating cash flows. This result gives evidence to reject the null hypothesis 1b that there is 
no difference in the persistence of the operating cash flow and the total fair value gain/loss. 
Furthermore, the result also gives evidence to reject the null hypothesis 1d(ii) that there is no 
difference in the persistence of the operating cash flow and the non-discretionary fair value 
gain/loss.  
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The operating cash flows are more persistent than the discretionary fair value gains and 
losses. This result provides evidence to reject the null hypotheses 1d(i) that there is no 
difference in the persistence of the operating cash flow and the discretionary fair value 
gain/loss.   
 
The non-discretionary fair value gains and losses are more persistent than the discretionary 
fair value gains and losses. This result gives evidence to reject the null hypotheses 1d(iii) that 
there is no difference in the persistence of the discretionary fair value gain/loss and the non-
discretionary fair value gain/loss.  
 
In summary, table 6 shows that non-discretionary loan provisions are the most persistent, 
followed by non-discretionary fair value gain/loss, operating cash flows and discretionary 
loan provisions, while the discretionary fair value gain/loss is the least persistent.  
 
Table 7 shows the results when earnings are regressed on the lagged earnings components.  
The coefficients of the lagged non-discretionary loan provision (non-discretionary fair value 
gains and losses) are substantially higher than that of the lagged discretionary loan provision 
(discretionary fair value gains and losses). The differences in coefficients are statistically 
significant at the 1% level.  
 
     [Insert Table 7] 
 
The difference in coefficients of 0.52 between the discretionary and the non-discretionary 
loan provisions is much larger than the difference between the coefficients of discretionary 
accruals and non-discretionary accruals of 0.13 in Xie (2001). In the next section, we 
investigate if the market prices correctly the persistence of discretionary and non-
discretionary loan provisions and fair value gains and losses. 
 
Kraft et al. (2007) suggest that one alternative to the Mishkin test is to directly regress one-
year ahead abnormal returns on the accounting variables of interest. They demonstrate that 
the parameter estimates and test statistics of this regression are asymptotically equivalent to 
that in the Mishkin tests. These accounting variables in our research are current operating 
cash flows, discretionary loan provisions, non-discretionary loan provisions, discretionary fair 
value gains and losses and non-discretionary fair value gains and losses.  
Abnormal return regressions and Mishkin tests 
 
Table 8 reports the results when one-year abnormal returns are regressed on the accounting 
variables. In columns 1 and 2 of table 8, the coefficients of LLtminus1 are negative and 
statistically significant. This result shows that loan provisions are over-weighted by the 
market because positive loan provisions lead to negative abnormal returns in the next period. 
Nonetheless, table 6 shows that the loan provisions are found to be more persistent than 
operating cash flows. We could not attribute the mispricing of loan provisions to the lower 
persistence of loan provisions compared to operating cash flows. Thus, we are unable to reject 
the null hypothesis 2a that the bank stock prices reflect correctly the persistence of loan 
provisions.   
 
     [Insert Table 8] 
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In the first column of table 8, the coefficient of fair value gains and losses are not statistically 
significant. This result provides little evidence to reject the null hypothesis 2b that the bank 
stock prices reflect correctly the persistence of fair value gains and losses. In the second, third 
and fourth columns, fair value gains/losses are further disaggregated into discretionary fair 
value gains/losses and non-discretionary fair value gains/losses. The coefficients of 
discretionary fair value gains/losses and non-discretionary fair value gains/losses are not 
statistically significant. The statistically insignificant coefficient of discretionary fair value 
gains/losses provide little evidence to reject the null hypothesis 2d(i) that the bank stock 
prices reflect correctly the persistence of discretionary fair value gains/losses. The statistically 
insignificant coefficient of non-discretionary fair value gains/losses provide little evidence to 
reject the null hypotheses 2d(ii) that the bank stock prices reflect correctly the persistence of 
non-discretionary fair value gains/losses. These results are consistent with prior literature that 
documents the value relevance of fair values (Barth, 1994; Barth et al., 1996; Venkatachalam, 
1996; Ahmed et al., 2006).  
 
In the third and the fourth columns of table 8, the total loan provisions are disaggregated into 
discretionary loan provisions and non-discretionary loan provisions. The coefficient of the 
discretionary loan provisions is negative and statistically significant in both columns. The 
negative and statistically significant coefficient of discretionary loan provision shows that 
discretionary loan provisions are over-weighted by the market. Panel A of table 6 shows that 
discretionary loan provisions are less persistent than non-discretionary loan provisions. At the 
same time, table 7 shows that the earnings performance attributable to the discretionary loan 
provisions is lower than the earnings performance attributable to the non-discretionary loan 
provisions.  Thus these results provide evidence to support the alternative hypothesis 2c(i) 
that the bank stock prices over-estimates the persistence of discretionary loan provisions. 
These results are consistent with Xie (2001) and prior literature that reports discretionary loan 
provisions being used for earnings management and capital management (Ma, 1988; Moyer, 
1990; Collins et al., 1995; Beatty et al., 1995; Ahmed et al., 1999; Kanagaretnam et al., 2004). 
 
In the fourth column of table 8, when a bank risk measure Returnvol is added to the equation, 
the coefficient of non-discretionary loan provision is not statistically significant.   The 
statistically insignificant coefficient of non-discretionary loan provision provides little 
evidence to reject the null hypotheses 2c(ii) that the bank stock prices reflect correctly the 
persistence of non-discretionary loan provisions.  
 
Table 9 reports the Mishkin test results from estimating the systems in equations 3 and 4. 
Panel A of table 9 reports the coefficient estimates for equations 3 and 4 obtained in the first 
stage. For discretionary loan provisions, the valuation coefficient of 1.379 is higher than the 
forecasting coefficient of 0.239. The likelihood ratio statistic of 11.817 reported in panel B is 
statistically significant at the 0.001 level, showing that the overpricing of discretionary loan 
provisions is statistically significant. This result provides further evidence to support the 
alternative hypothesis 2c(i) that the bank stock prices over-estimate the persistence of 
discretionary loan provisions, a result that is consistent with table 8. 2
                                                     
2 The results still hold after the addition of controls such as size (natural logarithm of market value) and 
corporate governance measure (separation of the CEO and Chairman position) in un-tabulated results.   
 In table 8, the 
coefficient of the discretionary loan provisions is negative and statistically significant 
indicating that discretionary loan provisions are over-weighted by the stock market. 
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     [Insert Table 9] 
 
For the non-discretionary loan provisions, panel B of table 9 reports a likelihood ratio statistic 
of 2.614, which is statistically not significant. This result provides little evidence to reject the 
null hypothesis 2c(ii) that the bank stock prices reflect correctly the persistence of non-
discretionary loan provisions. This result is consistent with table 8 that shows the coefficient 
of non-discretionary loan provision is not statistically significant in the regression of 
abnormal returns on the accounting variables. 
 
For the discretionary fair value gains/losses, panel B of table 9 shows a likelihood ratio 
statistic of 0.002, which is statistically not significant. This result provides little evidence to 
reject the null hypothesis 2d(i) that the bank stock prices reflect correctly the persistence of 
discretionary fair value gains and losses. This result is also consistent with table 8. 
 
For the non-discretionary fair value gains/losses, panel A of table 9 reports the valuation 
coefficient of -5.857, which is lower than the forecasting coefficient of 2.307. The likelihood 
ratio statistic of 18.757 reported in panel B indicates that the underpricing of non-
discretionary fair value gain/loss is statistically significant at the 0.000 level. Nonetheless, this 
result is inconsistent with table 8. In table 8, the statistically insignificant coefficient of non-
discretionary fair value gains/losses provide little evidence to reject the null hypotheses 2d(ii) 
that the bank stock prices reflect correctly the persistence of non-discretionary fair value 
gains/losses. 
 
We group banks into portfolio deciles each year based on their ranking of loan provisions, 
and form a hedge portfolio that is long in the most negative loan provisions and short in the 
most positive loan provisions. Table 10 reports the average of the 14 annual abnormal returns 
for each loan provision decile over the 1996-2009 sample period and the abnormal returns to 
the hedge portfolio. The abnormal returns of the lowest and the highest loan provision 
portfolios are -6.7% and -14.3% respectively. The hedge portfolio yields positive abnormal 
returns of 7.6% at the 1.4% statistical significance level. This result provides evidence to 
support the alternative hypothesis 3a that a trading strategy taking a long position in the stock 
of banks reporting lower loan provisions and a short position in the stock of banks reporting 
higher loan provisions generates positive abnormal stock returns. 
Hedge Portfolio Tests 
 
     [Insert Table 10] 
 
Table 11 panel A reports the results when the hedge portfolio test is repeated by ranking bank 
portfolios based on fair value gains and losses. The difference in abnormal returns between 
the highest and the lowest fair value gain portfolios is not statistically significant. The result 
shows that the hedge portfolio trading strategy based on fair value gains and losses does not 
generate abnormal returns. This is consistent with the value relevance of fair value gains and 
losses in prior studies (Barth et al., 1994; Barth et al., 1996) and the results of table 8. This 
result provides little evidence to reject the null hypothesis 3b that a trading strategy taking a 
long position in the stock of banks reporting higher fair value gains and a short position in the 
stock of banks reporting lower fair value gains does not generate abnormal stock returns. .  
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     [Insert Table 11] 
 
Panel B of table 11 shows that the abnormal return is highest (lowest) for the most (least) 
risky portfolios, consistent with required returns being positively related to risk. One 
possibility is that the discretionary loan provision anomaly is explained by risk, which we 
investigate in the next section “Additional analysis on risk”.   
 
We next form the hedge portfolios based on the ranking of discretionary loan provisions and 
non-discretionary loan provisions. Table 12 panel A reports the hedge portfolio test results. 
The abnormal returns of the lowest and the highest discretionary loan provision portfolios are 
-5.9% and -14.6% respectively. The hedge portfolio return (difference in abnormal returns 
between the highest and the lowest discretionary loan provision portfolios) is 8.7% and 
statistically significant at 1%. This result gives evidence to support the alternative hypothesis 
3c(i) that a trading strategy taking a long position in the stock of banks reporting lower 
discretionary loan provisions and a short position in the stock of banks reporting higher 
discretionary loan provisions generates positive abnormal stock returns. This result is also 
similar to that in Xie (2001), who documents statistically significant hedge portfolio returns 
of 11% for the discretionary accruals.  
 
[Insert Table 12] 
 
Consistent with Xie (2001), the hedge portfolio return for the non-discretionary loan 
provision portfolio is smaller than that for discretionary loan provision portfolio, at 5.4% and 
is not statistically significant at the 5% level (see table 12 panel B). This result provides little 
evidence to reject the null hypothesis 3c(ii) that a trading strategy taking a long position in the 
stock of banks reporting lower non-discretionary loan provisions and a short position in the 
stock of banks reporting higher non-discretionary loan provisions does not generate positive 
abnormal stock returns. The evidence is also consistent with tables 8 and 9 that indicate the 
stock market does not misprice non-discretionary loan provisions.  
 
There is a U-shaped relationship between risk and discretionary loan provisions in table 12 
panel A. The portfolios with the lowest and the highest discretionary loan provisions (deciles 
1, 2, 9 and 10) are the most risky. The high risk of bank stocks with extreme discretionary 
loan provisions is probably the reason why the discretionary loan provision anomaly is not 
arbitraged away. This reason is consistent with Mashruwala et al. (2006) who report that 
firms which exhibit an accrual anomaly have high idiosyncratic risk. Further tests are carried 
out in the section ”Additional analysis on risk” to test if risk explains the discretionary loan 
provision anomaly. On the other hand, there is a monotonic decrease in risk from the lowest 
to the highest non-discretionary loan provision portfolios (see table 12 panel B), consistent 
with risk being negatively related to the non-discretionary loan provisions.  
     
Table 13 shows the annual breakdown of abnormal returns for each discretionary loan 
provision decile. This table shows that the negative abnormal returns are largely driven by 
1996, 1997, 1999, 2006 and 20073
                                                     
3 The inferences to hypothesis 3c(i) that hedge portfolios formed based on discretionary loan provisions 
give positive abnormal returns remain unaffected when these years are excluded in un-tabulated results.  
. In 10 out of the 14 years in the 1996 to 2009 period, the 
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highest discretionary loan provision decile has lower abnormal returns than the lowest 
discretionary loan provision decile.  
 
     [Insert Table 13] 
 
Next, table 14 reports the results when hedge portfolios are formed based on the discretionary 
and the non-discretionary fair value gains and losses. Panel A shows that the abnormal returns 
to the hedge portfolios formed using the highest and the lowest discretionary fair value gains 
and losses are not statistically significant at 5%. This result provides little evidence to reject 
the null hypothesis 3d(i) that a trading strategy taking a long position in the stock of banks 
reporting higher discretionary fair value gains and a short position in the stock of banks 
reporting lower discretionary fair value gains does not generate abnormal stock returns.  
 
     [Insert Table 14] 
 
Similarly, the abnormal returns to the hedge portfolios formed based on the highest and the 
lowest non-discretionary fair value gains and losses are not statistically significant at 5% in 
table 14 panel B. This result provides little evidence to reject the null hypothesis 3d(ii) that a 
trading strategy taking a long position in the stock of banks reporting higher non-discretionary 
fair value gains and a short position in the stock of banks reporting lower non-discretionary 
fair value gains does not generate abnormal stock returns.        
 
In tables 15 to 16, further analysis are carried out to examine if bank risk has an effect on the 
results of hedge portfolios based on discretionary loan provisions reported in table 12. Table 
15 shows that the return difference between the highest and the lowest discretionary loan 
provision quintiles is mainly concentrated in the higher risk quintiles 3, 4 and 5. The 
difference is statistically significant at 7% for risk quintiles 3 and 5 and statistically 
significant at 1% for risk quintile 4. These results are consistent with the U-shaped 
relationship between risk and discretionary loan provisions documented in table 12 panel A. 
In table 12 panel A, the portfolios with the lowest and the highest discretionary loan 
provisions (deciles 1, 2, 9 and 10) are the most risky.  
Additional analysis on risk 
 
     [Insert Table 15] 
 
The return difference between the high risk/low discretionary loan provision and the low 
risk/high discretionary loan provision portfolios is 14.8% and statistically significant at the 
1% level. This is a significant increase from 8.7% return in the pure discretionary loan 
provision trading strategy. This shows that the returns can be enhanced by complementing the 
discretionary loan provision trading strategy with one that takes into account risk.  
 
In order to examine if risk explains the discretionary loan provision anomaly reported earlier, 
we employ the mimicking portfolio methodology in Khan (2008) and Chan and Chen (1991). 
This test is illustrated in figure 1. First, discretionary loan provision and risk quintiles are 
formed from independent sorts on discretionary loan provision and return volatility. The 
portfolio HH is formed by taking the intersection of banks in the highest risk quintile and the 
two highest discretionary loan provision quintiles. Portfolio LL is formed from the 
intersection of banks in the lowest risk quintile and the two lowest discretionary loan 
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provision quintiles. Hence, banks in portfolio HH have strictly higher risk and higher 
discretionary loan provisions than banks in portfolio LL. The return to HH minus the return to 
LL is called Riskdif. The discretionary loan provision index DLPdif is formed by taking the 
return to the lowest discretionary loan provision quintile portfolio (L) minus the return to the 
highest discretionary loan provision quintile portfolio (H). A positive correlation between 
Riskdif and DLPdif would suggest that the trading strategy on discretionary loan provisions 
would also be trading on bank risks. The negative correlation between Riskdif and DLPdif in 
table 16 is statistically not significantly different from negative one. This result demonstrates 
that risk does not explain the cross sectional variation in average returns to the highest and the 
lowest discretionary loan provision portfolios. 
 
     [Insert Table 16] 
 
6. Conclusion  
We extend the prior literature on the accrual anomaly and discretionary accrual anomaly 
(Sloan, 1996; Xie, 2001) to the setting of loan provisions in banks. The regression of 
abnormal returns on lagged earnings components provides evidence of stock market 
overweighting loan provisions. The hedge portfolio test shows that investors can profit from 
selling bank stocks with highest loan provisions and buying bank stocks with lowest loan 
provisions. However, as the loan provisions are more persistent than operating cash flows, 
this loan provision anomaly cannot be attributed to the lower persistence of loan provisions 
relative to operating cash flows.  
 
When loan provisions are further disaggregated into discretionary and non-discretionary 
components based on the models in prior discretionary loan provisioning literature such as 
Kanagaretnam et al. (2004), the abnormal return regression and Mishkin tests show that the 
market over-weights discretionary loan provisions. The hedge portfolio test shows that 
investors can make abnormal profits from selling portfolios with the highest discretionary 
loan provisions and buying portfolios with the lowest discretionary loan provisions. We also 
find that the discretionary loan provisions have low persistence. Thus we can attribute the 
discretionary loan provision anomaly to the low persistence of discretionary loan provisions. 
On the other hand, there is little evidence that the market misprices non-discretionary loan 
provisions and fair value gains and losses (discretionary or otherwise).  
 
In conclusion, our study documents the existence of loan provision anomaly and discretionary 
loan provision anomaly, similar to the accrual anomaly in Sloan (1996) and the discretionary 
accrual anomaly in Xie (2001). We could attribute the discretionary loan provision anomaly 
to the lack of persistence of discretionary loan provisions but the persistence explanation 
cannot be applied to the loan provision anomaly. This result provides market inefficiency as 
an alternative explanation to the signalling theory on the positive relation between 
discretionary loan provisions and bank stock returns. We find that risk is higher in the 
extreme discretionary loan provision portfolios. Buying bank stocks with low discretionary 
loan provision/high risk and selling stocks with high discretionary loan provision/low risk 
enhances the returns compared to a pure trading strategy on discretionary loan provision 
anomaly. Further tests show that risk does not explain the discretionary loan provision 
anomaly.  
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The policy implication of our paper is that the capital markets are struggling with 
understanding the loan provisions of banks, in particular their discretionary loan provisions.  
As a result, the market misprices discretionary loan provisions. There is a need for standard 
setters to focus their attention on loan provisions and to increase the transparency and the 
understandability of bank loan provisions reported to the markets. On the other hand, there is 
little evidence of fair value gains/losses being mispriced. This indicates that the capital market 
has a better understanding of the fair value numbers being reported by banks.  
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Table 1: Variable Definition 
 
Name Definition 
NI 
CFO 
FV 
FVres 
FVpre 
LL 
LLres 
LLpre 
Returns 
 
Areturns 
 
CFOtminus1 
FVtminus1 
FVrestminus1 
FVpretminus1 
LLtminus1 
LLrestminus1 
LLpretminus1 
LLA 
NPL 
∆NPL 
 
∆Loan 
 
Chargeoff 
Invtsec 
Tradasset 
USbd10y 
USDexch 
 
Fedfund 
Corpindex 
 
 
Returnvol 
 
 
Net income scaled by beginning total assets 
Net operating cash flow scaled by beginning total assets 
Fair value gains and losses scaled by beginning total assets 
Discretionary fair value gains and losses scaled by beginning total assets 
Non-discretionary fair value gains and losses scaled by beginning total assets 
Loan loss provisions scaled by beginning total assets.  
Discretionary loan provisions scaled by beginning total assets 
Non-discretionary loan provisions scaled by beginning total assets 
Returns at t+1. Return is the change in market value from prior year to current 
year, divided by the prior year market value.  
Difference between the buy-and-hold bank return and the market value-weighted 
bank return at t+1 
CFO lagged by one year 
FV lagged by one year 
FVres lagged by one year 
FVpre lagged by one year 
LL lagged by one year 
LLres lagged by one year 
LLpre lagged by one year 
Loan loss allowance for prior year scaled by beginning total assets 
Non-performing/impaired loans scaled by beginning total assets 
Change in non-performing loans from prior year to current year, scaled by 
beginning total assets 
Change in total loans from prior year to current year, scaled by beginning total 
assets  
Loan charge-offs scaled by beginning total assets 
Investment security assets scaled by beginning total assets 
Trading assets scaled by beginning total assets 
10 year US government bond yield rates (long term rates) 
US Nominal Broad Dollar Index by the Federal Reserve (trade weighted US 
dollar index)  
Federal Reserve fund interest rates (short term rates) 
Dow Jones Corporate Bond Index, an equally weighted basket of 96 recently 
issued investment-grade corporate bonds with laddered maturities. The index 
measures the return of readily tradable, high-grade U.S. corporate bonds.  
Daily return standard deviation average for each lagging bank/year as an 
indicator of each bank’s risk taking i.e. match against the same year as 
LLrestiminus1 
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics  
Panel A: Main regression test variables 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Median Skewness 
Returns 4476 -0.057 0.683 -2.696 1.925 0.000 -1.455 
NI 4476 0.007 0.011 -0.099 0.077 0.009  -2.722 
CFOtminus1 4476 0.013 0.020 -0.087 0.129 0.014 0.250 
FVtminus1 4476 0.0002 0.002 -0.007 0.007 0.0000 -0.837 
FVrestminus1 4476 -0.0000 0.001 -0.007 0.009 0.0000 -0.793 
FVpretminus1 4476 0.0001 0.001 -0.003 0.005 0.0002 0.495 
LLtminus1 4476 -0.004 0.006 -0.037 0.001 -0.002 -3.390 
LLrestminus1 4476 0.0001 0.004 -0.037 0.025 0.0003 -1.905 
LLpretminus1 4476 -0.004 0.005 -0.037 0.001 -0.002 -3.037 
Returnvol 4476 0.404 0.253 0.000 2.863 0.330 2.551 
The above table gives descriptive statistics for the main regression test variables.  
 
 
Panel B: Discretionary loan provision regression variables 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Median Skewness 
LLA 10042 0.009 0.004 0.001 0.033 0.008 1.871 
NPL 10042 0.010 0.013 0.000 0.086 0.006 3.242 
∆NPL 10042 0.002 0.008 -0.024 0.046 0.0004 2.441 
∆Loan 10042 0.093 0.132 -0.152 0.712 0.065 2.132 
Chargeoff 10042 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.015   0.000   5.268 
The above table gives descriptive statistics for the discretionary loan provision regressions. 
 
 
Panel C: Discretionary fair value regression variables 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Median Skewness 
Invtsec 8261 0.239 0.140 0.011 0.708 0.216 0.876 
Tradasset 8261 0.003 0.021 0.000 0.197 0.000   7.519 
USbd10y 8261 4.717 0.972 3.196 6.571 4.627 0.257 
USDexch 8261 111.590 8.996 92.631 126.798 110.837    0.183 
Fedfund 8261 3.320 2.022 0.159 6.259 3.887 -0.194 
Corpindex 8261 105.254 5.524 95.391 116.381 104.988   0.299 
The above table gives descriptive statistics for the discretionary fair value regressions. 
 
The variables are defined in table 1 and have been winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. 
Panel A indicates the main sample for the key regression tests. Panels B and C show the 
samples used in the estimation equations to derive discretionary loan provision and 
discretionary fair value gains and losses.  
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Table 3: Correlation Table 
Panel A: Correlations for variables in Main regression test (obs=4476) 
 
 NI CFOtm
minus1 
Fvtminu
s1 
Fvrestmi
nus1 
Fvpretm
inus1 
LLtminu
s1 
Llrestmi
nus1 
LLpretm
inus1 Returns 
NI 1.00         
CFOtminus1 0.13 1.00        
Fvtminus1 0.17 -0.01 1.00       
Fvrestminus1 0.06 -0.00 0.86 1.00      
Fvpretminus1 0.25 -0.00 0.45 -0.00 1.00     
LLtminus1 0.40 0.04 0.04 -0.04 0.17 1.00    
Llrestminus1 0.07 -0.02 -0.01 0.01 -0.02 0.57 1.00   
Llpretminus1 0.43 0.07 0.06 -0.05 0.22 0.80 -0.03 1.00  
Returns 0.13 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 -0.12 -0.06 -0.10 
 
1.00 
Returnvol -0.38 -0.10 -0.15 -0.00 -0.31 -0.58 -0.06 -0.66 0.09 
Panel A presents the correlation matrix of the variables used in the main regression tests.  
 
 
Panel B: Correlations for variables in Discretionary Loan provision regression test (obs=10042)
           
 LL LLA NPL ∆NPL ∆Loan 
LL 1.00     
LLA -0.34 1.00    
NPL -0.66 0.37 1.00   
∆NPL -0.54 0.03 0.70 1.00  
∆Loan 0.03 -0.03 -0.12 0.03 1.00 
Chargeoff -0.18 0.15 0.03 0.02 -0.04 
Panel B presents the correlation matrix of the variables used in the discretionary loan provision 
regressions.   
 
 
Panel C: Correlations for variables in Discretionary Fair value regression test (obs=8261) 
             
 FV FVtminus1 Invtsec Tradasset USbd10y USDexch Fedfund 
FV 1.00       
FVtminus1 0.34 1.00      
Invtsec 0.09 0.07 1.00     
Tradasset 0.19 0.22 -0.11 1.00    
USbd10y 0.04 0.09 0.15 -0.04 1.00   
USDexch 0.14 0.11 0.08 -0.01 0.08 1.00  
Fedfund -0.01 0.07 0.07 -0.02 0.87 -0.03 1.00 
Corpindex 0.09 0.02 -0.07 0.02 -0.70 -0.15 -0.63 
Panel C presents the correlation matrix of the variables used in the discretionary fair value regressions.  
Correlations in bold are statistically significant at the 1% level for all tables.  
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Table 4: Yearly regressions to derive discretionary and non-discretionary loan provisions  
 
Dependent: 
LL 
              
Independent 1996 
 
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
LLA 
-0.085 
(0.062) 
-0.084  
(0.069) 
-0.211 
(0.000) 
-0.225 
(0.001) 
-0.225 
(0.000) 
-0.350 
(0.000) 
-0.257 
(0.000) 
-0.126 
(0.013) 
-0.064 
(0.130) 
-0.008 
(0.827) 
-0.084 
(0.016) 
-0.249 
(0.000) 
-0.542 
(0.000) 
-0.860 
(0.000) 
NPL 
-0.096 
(0.001) 
-0.069 
(0.003) 
-0.090 
(0.008) 
-0.141 
(0.002) 
-0.111 
(0.001) 
-0.129 
(0.000) 
-0.143 
(0.000) 
-0.074 
(0.009) 
-0.062 
(0.049) 
-0.130 
(0.000) 
-0.095 
(0.000) 
-0.224 
(0.000) 
-0.177 
(0.000) 
-0.123 
(0.000) 
∆NPL -0.028 (0.585) 
-0.067 
(0.174) 
-0.090 
(0.093) 
-0.086 
(0.375) 
-0.140 
(0.002) 
-0.043 
(0.451) 
-0.140 
(0.007) 
-0.020 
(0.708) 
-0.029 
(0.412) 
-0.024 
(0.594) 
0.002 
(0.944) 
-0.018 
(0.642) 
-0.149 
(0.012) 
0.126 
(0.000) 
∆Loan -0.002 (0.107) 
0.000 
(0.995) 
-0.004 
(0.015) 
-0.006 
(0.010) 
-0.003 
(0.007) 
-0.005 
(0.004) 
-0.003 
(0.046) 
-0.005 
(0.000) 
-0.006 
(0.000) 
-0.007 
(0.000) 
-0.005 
(0.000) 
-0.004 
(0.045) 
0.003 
(0.492) 
0.002 
(0.507) 
Chargeoff -0.413 (0.002) 
-0.436 
(0.000) 
-0.379 
(0.000) 
-0.408 
(0.030) 
-0.311 
(0.004) 
-0.613 
(0.000) 
-0.398 
(0.001) 
-0.335 
(0.000) 
-0.151 
(0.043) 
-0.265 
(0.000) 
-0.325 
(0.000) 
-0.499 
(0.000) 
-0.796 
(0.000) 
-0.303 
(0.000) 
Intercept -0.000 (0.635) 
-0.001 
(0.009) 
0.000 
(0.329) 
-0.001 
(0.047) 
0.000 
(0.311) 
0.001 
(0.006) 
0.000 
(0.348) 
-0.000 
(0.212) 
-0.000 
(0.270) 
-0.000 
(0.151) 
0.000 
(0.809) 
0.002 
(0.001) 
0.002 
(0.018) 
-0.004 
(0.000) 
Adjusted R 0.219 2 0.170 0.304 0.275 0.295 0.364 0.346 0.166 0.140 0.167 0.178 0.456 0.569 0.628 
Obs. 708 699 643 710 812 775 800 776 751 731 712 670 634 621 
               
Figures in brackets are p values.
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Table 5: Regressions to derive discretionary and non-discretionary fair value gains and losses 
 
Dependent:  FV FV 
Independent:     
FVtminus1   0.3178 (0.000) 
Invtsec -0.0161 (0.026) -0.0167 (0.017) 
Tradasset -0.1640 (0.010) -0.1275 (0.037) 
USbd10y 0.0003 (0.000) 0.0008 (0.000) 
USDexch 0.0000 (0.000) 0.0000 (0.003) 
Fedfund 0.0000 (0.098) -0.0001 (0.004) 
Corpindex 0.0000 (0.000) 0.0001 (0.000) 
Invtsec * USbd10y 0.0006 (0.069) 0.0005 (0.071) 
Invtsec & USDexch 0.0000 (0.027) 0.0000 (0.049) 
Invtsec * Fedfund -0.0002 (0.096) -0.0002 (0.070) 
Invtsec * Corpindex 0.0001 (0.025) 0.0001 (0.010) 
Tradasset * USbd10y 0.0038 (0.556) 0.0067 (0.248) 
Tradasset * USDexch 0.0001 (0.695) -0.0001 (0.778) 
Tradasset * Fedfund 0.0013 (0.541) -0.0007 (0.709) 
Tradasset * Corpindex 0.0014 (0.002) 0.0011 (0.007) 
Year Dummies No Yes 
Intercept -0.0077 (0.000) -0.0153 (0.000) 
Adjusted R 0.1124 0.2142 
Obs. 8261 8261 
 
Table 5 shows pooled regressions of fair value gains and losses on lagged fair value gains and losses, 
investment securities, trading assets and market data to derive discretionary and non-discretionary fair 
value gains and losses4
                                                     
4 Cross section regressions or regressions based on rolling 2 years cannot be run because many 
variables are dropped in these regressions. 
 . All variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. Figures in brackets 
are p values. 
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Table 6: Persistence of operating cash flow, loan provision, discretionary loan provision, 
non-discretionary loan provision, fair value gains and losses, discretionary fair value 
gains and losses, non-discretionary fair value gains and losses 
 
Panel 
Dependent:  
A 
CFO LL LLres LLpre 
Independent:         
CFOtminus1 0.245 (0.000) 
      
LLtminus1   0.650 (0.000)   
  
LLrestminus1     0.280 (0.000) 
  
LLpretminus1       0.827  (0.000) 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Intercept 0.008 (0.000) -0.001 (0.000) -0.000 (0.855) -0.001 (0.000) 
Adjusted R 0.100 2 0.536 0.061 0.755 
Obs. 4476 4476 4476 4476 
 
Dependent:  
Panel B 
FV FVres FVpre 
Independent:       
Fvtminus1 0.351 (0.000) 
    
FVrestminus1   0.004 (0.902)   
FVpretminus1     0.528 (0.000) 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Intercept 0.000 (0.000) -0.000 (0.680) 0.000 (0.000) 
Adjusted R 0.202 2 -0.002 0.533 
Obs. 4476 4476 4476 
 
Table 6 panel A tests the persistence of operating cash flow, loan provisions, discretionary 
loan provisions and  non-discretionary loan provisions . Panel B tests the persistence of fair 
value gains and losses, discretionary fair value gains and losses and non-discretionary fair 
value gains and losses. All variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. Figures in 
brackets are p values. 
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Table 7: Regressions of net income on lagged loan provision, operating cash flow, fair 
value gains and losses and discretionary/non-discretionary loan provisions/fair value 
gains and losses, bank risk 
 
Dependent:  NI NI NI NI 
Independent:     
    
CFOtminus1 0.066 (0.000) 0.066 (0.000) 0.061 (0.000) 
 
0.058 
 
 
(0.000) 
 
FVtminus1 1.090 (0.010)           
FVrestminus1   0.638 (0.001) 0.686 (0.000) 0.659 (0.000) 
FVpretminus1   3.026 (0.000) 2.636 (0.000) 2.373 (0.000) 
LLtminus1 0.721 (0.000) 0.680 (0.000)     
LLrestminus1     0.281 (0.001) 0.256 (0.000) 
LLpretminus1     0.903 (0.000) 0.774 (0.000) 
Returnvol       
 
-0.004 
 
 
(0.000) 
 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Intercept 0.009 (0.000) 0.009 (0.000) 0.010 (0.000) 0.011 (0.000) 
Adjusted R 0.193 0.211 0.237 0.241 
Obs. 4476 4476 4476 4476 
 
Table 7 shows regressions of net income on lagged loan provisions, operating cash flows, fair 
value gains and losses, discretionary and non-discretionary loan provisions and fair values. 
All variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. Figures in brackets are p values. 
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Table 8: Regressions of abnormal returns on lagged operating cash flow, loan provision, 
fair value gains and losses, bank risk 
 
Dependent:  Areturns  Areturns Areturns Areturns 
Independent:     
    
CFOtminus1 0.305 (0.375) 0.314 (0.361) 0.316 (0.359) 
 
0.337 
 
 
(0.330) 
 
FVtminus1 1.923 (0.714)       
FVrestminus1   -0.158 (0.978) -0.025 (0.996) 0.159 (0.978) 
FVpretminus1   7.697 (0.600) 7.590 (0.605) 8.583 (0.564) 
LLtminus1 -6.599 (0.003) -6.618 (0.003)     
LLrestminus1     -7.114 (0.020) -6.741 (0.031) 
LLpretminus1     -5.979 (0.037) -4.848 (0.129) 
Returnvol       
 
0.072 
 
 
(0.262) 
 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Intercept -0.478 (0.000) -0.480 (0.000) -0.479 (0.000) -0.507 (0.000) 
Adjusted R 0.090 0.089 0.089 0.093 
Obs. 4476 4476 4476 4476 
 
Table 8 shows regressions of abnormal returns on lagged operating cash flows, loan 
provisions, fair value gains and losses, discretionary and non-discretionary loan provisions 
and fair values. All variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. Figures in brackets are 
p values. 
 41 
Table 9: Mishkin test of the market pricing of operating cash flows, discretionary loan 
provisions, non-discretionary loan provisions, discretionary fair value gains and losses, 
non-discretionary fair value gains and losses and bank risk with respect to their 
implications for one-year ahead earnings 
 
Panel A: Market pricing of Earnings components with respect to their implications for one-
year ahead earnings 
NIt+1 = α0 + α1CFOt + α2LLrest+ α3LLpret+ α4FVrest + α5FVpret + α6Returnvolt + υ
Areturns
 t+1 
t+1 = γ+ β (NIt+1 - α0 - α1*CFOt - α2*LLrest- α3*LLpret- α4*FVrest- α5*FVpret- 
α6
*Returnvolt) + ε
 
 t+1 
Forecasting coefficients Valuation coefficients 
Parameter Estimate Std. error Parameter Estimate 
α
Std. error 
1 0.056 CFO 0.007 α1* -0.006 CFO 0.055 
α2 0.239 LLres 0.040 α2* 1.379 LLres 0.329 
α3 0.750 LLpre 0.040 α3* 1.242 LLpre 0.302 
α4 0.658 FVres 0.109 α4* 0.625 FVres 0.817 
α5 2.307 Fvpre 0.218 α5* -5.857 FVpre 1.873 
α6 -0.005 Returnvol 0.001 α6* -0.006 Returnvol 0.006 
 
Panel B: Market efficiency tests  
 
Null hypothesis Chi2 
α
P value 
1 = α1 1.250 * 0.264 
α2 = α2 11.817 * 0.001 
α3 = α3 2.614 * 0.106 
α4 = α4 0.002 * 0.968 
α5 = α5 18.757 * 0.000 
α6 = α6 0.026 *  0.873 
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Table 10: Abnormal returns for portfolios ranked by loan provisions 
 
Portfolios ranked by loan provisions (1 = 
lowest, 10 = highest loan provisions) 
Abnormal returns at t+1 
1 -0.067 
2 -0.026 
3 -0.089 
4 -0.074   
5 -0.058 
6 -0.088 
7 -0.106 
8 -0.098 
9 -0.131 
10 -0.143 
Difference bet. deciles 1 and 10 p value -0.076 (0.014) 
Difference bet. deciles 1 and 2 p value 0.041 (0.224) 
Difference bet. deciles 2 and 3 p value -0.063 (0.034) 
Difference bet. deciles 3 and 4 p value 0.015 (0.585)   
Difference bet. deciles 4 and 5 p value 0.016 (0.583) 
Difference bet. deciles 5 and 6 p value -0.030 (0.256) 
Difference bet. deciles 6 and 7 p value -0.017 (0.448) 
Difference bet. deciles 7 and 8 p value 0.007 (0.749) 
Difference bet. deciles 8 and 9 p value -0.033 (0.197) 
Difference bet. deciles 9 and 10 p value -0.012 (0.661) 
Obs. 4476 
  
Figures in brackets are p values in tests of significant difference from zero and difference 
between portfolio deciles.  
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Table 11: Abnormal returns for portfolios ranked by fair value gains and losses and risk 
Panel A 
Portfolios ranked by fair value gain (1 = 
lowest, 10 = highest fair value gain) 
Abnormal returns at t+1 
1 -0.075 
2 -0.100 
3 -0.089 
4 -0.090 
5 -0.120 
6 -0.127 
7 -0.092 
8 -0.073 
9 -0.088 
10 -0.029 
Deciles 1 and 10 p value 0.046 (0.108) 
Deciles 1 and 2 p value -0.025 (0.375) 
Deciles 2 and 3 p value 0.011 (0.698) 
Deciles 3 and 4 p value -0.001 (0.968) 
Deciles 4 and 5 p value -0.030 (0.272) 
Deciles 5 and 6 p value -0.007 (0.804) 
Deciles 6 and 7 p value 0.035 (0.209) 
Deciles 7 and 8 p value 0.019 (0.469) 
Deciles 8 and 9 p value -0.015 (0.557)   
Deciles 9 and 10 p value 0.059 (0.027) 
Obs. 4476 
  
Figures in brackets are p values in tests of significant difference from zero and difference 
between portfolio deciles.  
Panel B 
Portfolios ranked by return volatility (1 = 
lowest, 10 = highest return volatility) 
Abnormal returns at t+1 
1 -0.108 
2 -0.121 
3 -0.116 
4 -0.108 
5 -0.082 
6 -0.105 
7 -0.081 
8 -0.072 
9 -0.059 
10 -0.044 
Deciles 1 and 10 p value 0.064 (0.048) 
Deciles 1 and 2 p value -0.013 (0.601) 
Deciles 2 and 3 p value 0.005 (0.824) 
Deciles 3 and 4 p value 0.008 (0.743) 
Deciles 4 and 5 p value 0.026 (0.318) 
Deciles 5 and 6 p value -0.023 (0.345) 
Deciles 6 and 7 p value 0.024 (0.362) 
Deciles 7 and 8 p value 0.009 (0.724) 
Deciles 8 and 9 p value 0.013 (0.677) 
Deciles 9 and 10 p value 0.015 (0.648) 
Obs. 4476 
Figures in brackets are p values in tests of significant difference from zero and difference 
between portfolio deciles.  
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Table 12: Abnormal returns and risk for portfolios ranked by discretionary and non-
discretionary loan provisions 
Panel A 
Portfolios ranked by discretionary loan 
provisions (1 = lowest, 10 = highest 
discretionary loan provisions) 
Abnormal returns at t+1 Returnvol 
1 -0.059    0.459 
2 -0.032 0.433 
3 -0.012 0.399 
4 -0.093 0.396 
5 -0.083 0.380 
6 -0.123 0.384 
7 -0.091 0.386 
8 -0.135  0.380 
9 -0.105 0.416 
10 -0.146   0.431 
Difference bet. deciles 1 and 10 p value -0.087  (0.006) -0.028 (0.136) 
Difference bet. deciles 1 and 2 p value 0.027 (0.409) -0.026 (0.175) 
Difference bet. deciles 2 and 3 p value 0.021 (0.500) -0.034 (0.063) 
Difference bet. deciles 3 and 4 p value -0.081 (0.003) -0.003 (0.810) 
Difference bet. deciles 4 and 5 p value 0.009 (0.715) -0.016 (0.308) 
Difference bet. deciles 5 and 6 p value -0.040 (0.123) -0.004 (0.808) 
Difference bet. deciles 6 and 7 p value 0.032 (0.186) 0.002 (0.858) 
Difference bet. deciles 7 and 8 p value -0.044 (0.056) -0.006 (0.673)  
Difference bet. deciles 8 and 9 p value 0.030 (0.233) 0.036 (0.032) 
Difference bet. deciles 9 and 10 p value -0.041 (0.155)     0.015 (0.401) 
Obs. 4476 4476 
Panel B 
Portfolios ranked by non-discretionary 
loan provisions (1 = lowest, 10 = 
highest non-discretionary loan 
provisions) 
Abnormal returns at t+1 Returnvol 
1 -0.063 0.499 
2 -0.080 0.440 
3 -0.094 0.433 
4 -0.104 0.408 
5 -0.103 0.404 
6 -0.085   0.400 
7 -0.088 0.378 
8 -0.046 0.382 
9 -0.097 0.368 
10 -0.117 0.354 
Deciles 1 and 10 p value -0.054 (0.082) -0.145 (0.000) 
Deciles 1 and 2 p value -0.017 (0.606) -0.059 (0.010) 
Deciles 2 and 3 p value -0.014 (0.625) -0.013 (0.681) 
Deciles 3 and 4 p value -0.010 (0.730)    -0.025 (0.129) 
Deciles 4 and 5 p value 0.001 (0.977)   -0.004 (0.814) 
Deciles 5 and 6 p value 0.018 (0.488) -0.004 (0.783) 
Deciles 6 and 7 p value -0.003 (0.903) -0.022 (0.158) 
Deciles 7 and 8 p value 0.042 (0.110) 0.004 (0.813) 
Deciles 8 and 9 p value -0.051 (0.037) -0.014 (0.287) 
Deciles 9 and 10 p value -0.020 (0.400)   -0.014 (0.272) 
Obs. 4476 4476 
Figures in brackets are p values in tests of significant difference from zero and difference 
between portfolio deciles.  
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Table 13: Yearly abnormal returns for portfolios ranked by discretionary loan provisions 
 
               
1996 1 = lowest, 10 
= highest 
discretionary 
LL) 
 
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
1 -0.102 -0.403   0.010 -0.226 0.063 0.030 0.102 0.021 0.125 -0.135 -0.118 -0.180 -0.122 -0.063 
2 0.059 -0.391 -0.216 -0.131 0.112 0.183 0.146 -0.003 0.085 -0.119 -0.139 -0.200 -0.121 0.122 
3 -0.006 -0.443 -0.025 -0.010 0.303 0.192 0.006 0.055 -0.042 -0.098 -0.128 -0.066 -0.047 0.037 
4 -0.070 -0.428 -0.207 -0.127 0.086 0.123 -0.036 -0.094 0.049 -0.162 -0.078 -0.155 -0.282 -0.052 
5 -0.180 -0.447 -0.155 -0.302 0.189 0.053 0.072 -0.004 -0.058 -0.102 0.015 -0.140 -0.225 -0.118 
6 -0.276 -0.480 -0.252 -0.223 0.068 0.058 -0.032 -0.091 -0.060 -0.131 -0.065 -0.213 -0.193 -0.117 
7 -0.008 -0.507 -0.146 -0.006 0.127 0.042 0.010 -0.101 -0.013 -0.177 -0.009 -0.231 -0.193 -0.105 
8 -0.093 -0.466 -0.191 -0.186 -0.022  0.055 -0.019 -0.100 0.012 -0.163 -0.076 -0.236 -0.304 -0.203 
9   0.122 -0.417 -0.203 -0.271 -0.069 0.068 0.006 0.005 -0.065 -0.190 -0.015 -.1955 -0.202 -0.108 
10 -0.128 -0.592 -0.150 -0.075 0.019 0.052 0.131 -0.013 -0.110 -0.186 -0.090 -0.321 -0.279 -0.342 
Deciles 1 & 10  (0.848) (0.082) (0.252) (0.338) (0.639) (0.751) (0.790) (0.677) (0.003) (0.888) (0.591) (0.165) (0.327) (0.087) 
Deciles 1 & 2 (0.363) (0.915) (0.094) (0.544) (0.626)   (0.019) (0.634) (0.784) (0.709) (0.767) (0.697)   (0.830) (0.994) (0.273) 
Deciles 2 & 3 (0.711) (0.532) (0.056) (0.350) (0.130) (0.936) (0.127)   (0.473) (0.160)   (0.826) (0.837) (0.071) (0.541) (0.605)   
Deciles 3 & 4 (0.656) (0.848) (0.066) (0.414) (0.059) (0.497) (0.543) (0.006) (0.188) (0.477) (0.339) (0.137)   (0.037) (0.492) 
Deciles 4 & 5 (0.311) (0.840) (0.347) (0.169) (0.333) (0.252)  (0.135) (0.064) (0.098) (0.201) (0.238)   (0.800) (0.626) (0.610) 
Deciles 5 & 6 (0.536) (0.728) (0.105) (0.278) (0.312) (0.921) (0.187)   (0.077) (0.954) (0.564) (0.341) (0.282) (0.824) (0.998) 
Deciles 6 & 7 (0.152) (0.733) (0.191) (0.057) (0.546) (0.815) (0.578)   (0.788) (0.342) (0.270) (0.334) (0.775) (0.995) (0.916) 
Deciles 7 & 8 (0.491) (0.624) (0.549) (0.121) (0.066)   (0.868) (0.634) (0.988)   (0.655) (0.689) (0.154) (0.948) (0.305) (0.374) 
Deciles 8 & 9 (0.224) (0.606) (0.823) (0.295) (0.484)   (0.836) (0.697) (0.169) (0.204) (0.391) (0.452) (0.597) (0.428) (0.449) 
Deciles 9 & 10 (0.167) (0.057) (0.399) (0.103) (0.273) (0.809) (0.241) (0.840) (0.399) (0.888) (0.359) (0.147) (0.568) (0.136) 
Obs.   128 188   231 262 304   322 349 344 364 385 387 385   385 442 
 
This table shows the yearly abnormal returns for each portfolio ranked by discretionary loan provisions, a yearly breakdown of table 12 panel A. 
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Table 14: Abnormal returns for portfolios ranked by discretionary and non-
discretionary fair value gains and losses 
Panel A 
Portfolios ranked by discretionary fair value 
gains and losses (1 = lowest, 10 = highest 
discretionary fair value gains and losses) 
Abnormal returns at t+1 
1 -0.092 
2 -0.094 
3 -0.110 
4 -0.110 
5 -0.079 
6 -0.081 
7 -0.127 
8 -0.079 
9 -0.072 
10 -0.041 
Difference bet. deciles 1 and 10 p value 0.051 (0.068) 
Difference bet. deciles 1 and 2 p value -0.002 (0.940) 
Difference bet. deciles 2 and 3 p value -0.016 (0.543) 
Difference bet. deciles 3 and 4 p value 0.000 (0.999)   
Difference bet. deciles 4 and 5 p value 0.031 (0.296) 
Difference bet. deciles 5 and 6 p value -0.002 (0.948) 
Difference bet. deciles 6 and 7 p value -0.046 (0.104) 
Difference bet. deciles 7 and 8 p value 0.048 (0.072) 
Difference bet. deciles 8 and 9 p value 0.007 (0.783) 
Difference bet. deciles 9 and 10 p value 0.031 (0.266)   
Obs. 4476 
Panel B 
Portfolios ranked by non-discretionary fair 
value gains and losses (1 = lowest, 10 = 
highest non-discretionary fair value gains and 
losses) 
Abnormal returns at t+1 
1 -0.113 
2 -0.033 
3 -0.117 
4 -0.079 
5 -0.102 
6 -0.112 
7 -0.066 
8 -0.096 
9 -0.098 
10 -0.068 
Deciles 1 and 10 p value 0.045 (0.104) 
Deciles 1 and 2 p value 0.080 (0.005) 
Deciles 2 and 3 p value -0.084 (0.004) 
Deciles 3 and 4 p value 0.038 (0.151) 
Deciles 4 and 5 p value -0.023 (0.381) 
Deciles 5 and 6 p value -0.010 (0.711) 
Deciles 6 and 7 p value 0.046 (0.120) 
Deciles 7 and 8 p value -0.030 (0.313)   
Deciles 8 and 9 p value -0.002 (0.923)  
Deciles 9 and 10 p value 0.030 (0.245) 
Obs. 4476 
Figures in brackets are p values in tests of significant difference from zero and difference 
between portfolio deciles.   
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Table 15: Abnormal returns for portfolios based on discretionary loan provision and 
bank risk 
 
Abnormal returns at t+1 
 Low 
DLP - 1 
2 3 4 High 
DLP - 5 
High 
minus 
Low 
P value 
Low returnvol 
- 1 
-0.116 -0.046 -0.132 -0.124 -0.148 -0.032 (0.496) 
2 -0.122 -0.069 -0.121 -0.108 -0.140 -0.018 (0.667) 
3 -0.034 -0.096 -0.099 -0.119 -0.117 -0.083 (0.069) 
4 -0.009 -0.059 -0.116 -0.089 -0.126 -0.117 (0.015) 
High returnvol 
- 5 
-0.000 0.012 -0.071 -0.124 -0.099 -0.099 (0.068) 
High minus 
Low 
0.116 0.058 0.061 0.000 0.049   
P value (0.053) (0.237) (0.184) (0.997) (0.331)   
High 
returnvol/ 
Low DLP 
minus Low 
returnvol/High 
DLP 
 0.148       
P value (0.004)       
 
This table shows the abnormal returns for each discretionary (DLP) quintile and return 
volatility quintile. The column ‘High minus Low’ shows the difference in returns between the 
highest and lowest discretionary loan provision portfolios for each risk (return volatility) 
quintile. The row ‘High minus Low’ shows the difference in returns between the highest and 
lowest risk (return volatility) portfolios for each discretionary loan provision quintile. Figures 
in brackets are p values in tests of significant difference from zero. 
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Table 16: Mimicking portfolios for Khan (2008), Chan and Chen (1991) tests 
 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Median Skewness 
        
DLPdif 14 0.036 0.043 -0.041 0.127 0.034 0.344 
Riskdif 14 -0.020 0.104 -0.260 0.122 0.006 -1.057 
 
 
Panel B: Correlation matrix 
 
 DLPdif Riskdif 
DLPdif 1.000  
Riskdif -0.527 1.000 
   
 
This table shows the descriptive statistics and correlation of the returns to two mimicking 
portfolios for the 14 years from 1996 to 2009. DLPdif is the return on low discretionary loan 
provision minus high discretionary loan provision portfolios. Riskdif is the return on high risk 
(return volatility) and high discretionary loan provision minus low risk and low discretionary 
loan provision portfolios.  
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Fig 1: Composition of mimicking portfolios L, H, LL and HH in Khan (2008), Chan and 
Chen (1991) tests 
 
 
 Portfolio L: Bottom Discretionary Loan 
Provision quintile 
 
 
Portfolio HH: High 
discretionary loan 
provision and high risk 
Discretionary Loan 
Provision quintile 2 
 
Discretionary Loan 
Provision quintile 3 
Low risk 
Low risk 
Portfolio H: Top 
Discretionary Loan 
Provision quintile 
 
 
Discretionary Loan 
Provision quintile 4 
 
High risk 
High risk 
Portfolio LL: Low 
discretionary loan 
provision and Low risk 
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Appendix A: Movements in sample size across years 
 
 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
C/f total  128 188 231 262 304 322 349 344 364 385 387 385 385 
Drop  0 22 30 33 25 27 46 29 31 39 31 36 36 
Survive (C/f total 
minus Drop)  128 166 201 229 279 295 303 315 333 346 356 349 349 
New  60 65 61 75 43 54 41 49 52 41 29 36 93 
Total 128 188 231 262 304 322 349 344 364 385 387 385 385 442 
               
Drop breakdown               
Bankruptcy    1   1      5 1 
Forced delisting 
e.g. low price, 
insufficient equity, 
stop trading 
    1 1 1 2  2 1 1 4 14 
Delisting at 
company request 
e.g. gone private 
  1  2   1   1 2 2 2 
Missing data in 
Compustat5    3 5 7 4 7 
10 
 7 1 9 14 19 9 
Merger   18 24 23 20 18 33 22 28 28 14 6 10 
 
                                                     
5 This excludes cases where missing returns are set to zero based on Kraft et al. (2006).  
